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Blockchain technology has the novel ability to ‘create’ trust in a decentralised environment. With this 
technology, third-parties and middlemen are no longer necessary to enforce transactions. Instead, 
blockchain uses decentralised consensus protocols and embedded logic to enforce contracts. The 
applications of blockchain are vast and include cryptonetworks, the culmination of blockchain and 
crypto tokens. Cryptonetworks can have an impact on the business models of firms, both in terms of 
cost structure and value creation. By blending the functionality of centralised platforms with the 
community-orientated nature of the original open protocols of the internet, cryptonetworks enable 
value creation to be correctly assigned to the actual content creators through tokens. The work of 
Ronald Coase illustrated the need for firms to overcome the transaction costs of operating within the 
market. Cryptonetworks, however, provide an alternative ‘middle ground’ option to the firm and the 
market, allowing both to benefit from reduced transaction costs and incentive maximisation of the 
market. In addition, the implementation of economics in today’s cryptonetworks, often referred to as 
‘cryptoeconomics’, remains conventional and conservative, placing a limit on the potential of 
cryptonetworks. By revaluating and reconstructing today’s value measurement criteria, 
cryptonetworks have the potential to move beyond a single ‘Hayekian price’ and instead incorporate 
multiple other indexes that better measure and capture value creation as it pertains to wider social 
issues of production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Finally, this thesis 
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Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology (DLT) that stores and sequentially links groups of 
transactions (known as ‘blocks’) using cryptography (Crosby et al., 2016; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 
2019). The real innovation introduced by blockchain is that no single organisation or individual owns 
the blockchain. Instead, it is ‘owned’ by a distributed peer-to-peer network, provides redundancies 
of the data stored in the blockchain, and uses a consensus protocol to ensure that past transactions 
cannot be tampered with. The most well-known use case of blockchain has been cryptocurrencies, 
most notably Bitcoin. The technology, however, offers far greater prospects for any transactions 
requiring authentication (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017). As such, the focus of this study is not 
cryptocurrencies but another implementation of blockchain: cryptonetworks. At a high-level, a 
cryptonetwork is a blockchain-powered network that utilises tokens as the network’s ‘currency’ or 
utility function (Oliveira et al., 2018; Lee, 2019; Tönnissen, Beinke & Teuteberg, 2020) and is governed 
by rules to create a secure, trustworthy, and ultimately valuable system for all participants. The rules 
of a cryptonetwork are hardcoded into its respective blockchain protocol. The principles of 
cryptoeconomics are then used to design the rules and incentives of the network. Cryptoeconomics is 
the culmination of cryptography, token design, and economic incentives. The development of 
cryptonetworks is an exciting endeavour that could potentially disrupt today’s closed (centralised) 
platforms and their underlying business models (Lee, 2019; Prewett, Prescott & Phillips, 2020). The 
disruptive potential of cryptonetworks lies in the creation of open platforms that harness communities 
of developers and users who benefit from the growth of the network. 
This study has two research questions: 
RQ 1: What impact can cryptonetworks have on existing business models of firms, both in terms of 
cost structure and in terms of value creation? 
This study advances the thesis that cryptonetworks represent the most ambitious and promising 
attempt to disrupt existing business models of firms. Implications for the way firms operate and are 
governed are profound. The argument advanced here is that cryptonetworks share properties of both 
the market and firm, and that cryptonetworks accordingly provide a ‘middle ground’ alternative that 
overcomes the firm’s transaction cost benefits while maintaining the incentivisation mechanisms of 
the market (Coase, 1937, 2013; Wang, 2018; Lee, 2019). In doing so, cryptonetworks would represent 
a fundamental change in the cost structure of firms. In addition, by blending the functionality of 
centralised platforms with the community-orientated nature of the original open protocols of the 





RQ 2: Do cryptonetworks enable new measurement tools such as to redefine the nature of value 
creation? 
The use of economic theories within blockchain-enabled applications such as cryptonetworks is 
referred to as cryptoeconomics. Current cryptoeconomic literature provides a conventional and 
conservative evaluation of the underlying economics. However, the strict restriction of 
cryptoeconomics to orthodox economics limits the potential of cryptoeconomics and thus of 
cryptonetworks. Cryptoeconomics focuses on designing cryptonetworks with incentives applicable to 
‘rational’ actors. The opportunity cost is the forgone utility of tokens beyond their use in 
incentivisation mechanisms. In the 1940s, the argument for ‘the market’ stood as a strong alternative 
to 1940s central planning. Today though, this argument is not as strong. Advancements in big data 
and blockchain enable access to mass amounts of data that can be processed using existing 
computational power. Thus, the desire and need to simplify and reduce complex variables to a single 
‘Hayekian price’ no longer exists. As such, by creating new measurement tools, cryptoeconomics looks 
to provide opportunities to redefine and capture value. 
 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a primer to blockchain technology is provided. Additionally, the 
circumstances leading to the invention of blockchain technology are discussed, as are the reasons why 
its real potential is the creation of trust. Lastly, there is a brief discussion of the types of blockchains, 
consensus protocols and the various industry applications of the technology. Cryptonetworks and 
their potential impact on business models are introduced in Chapter 3, both in terms of cost structure 
and value. In Chapter 4, an exploratory framework on the potential of cryptoeconomics is offered. It 
is argued that cryptonetworks offer the opportunity to rethink and reconstruct the way value is 
perceived and indeed measured in today’s economies. The cryptonetwork MakerDAO is discussed in 
Chapter 5 and is used as a practical illustration of a cryptonetwork. Finally, concluding remarks and 










Material and methods 
This is a conceptual research paper which consists of a literature examination to offer a primer on 
blockchain technology. The contributions of this paper include looking at the history of the technology 
and how it functions, as well as, outlining the different types of blockchains and their relevant 
applications. The central research questions are then to understand the potential impact of the 
technology on a firm’s business model both in terms of cost structure and value creation 
measurement tools. The objective is to provide some definition on the topic as it pertains to 
economics. A case study is then used to illustrate one application of the technology. 
The research was conducted using desk research of current business press papers, professional 
reports, company web pages and blog posts concerning blockchain technology. Secondary sources 
were screened using the UCT Primo service as well as the Web of Science database. A combination of 
various terms was used including “blockchain”, “cryptonetworks”, “tokens” and “cryptoeconomics”. 
The number of results varied greatly, with the highest number of results showing for “blockchain” 
whilst only a few to no results for “cryptonetworks”, “tokens” and “cryptoeconomics”. This can be 
interpreted to the novelty of the topic addressed in this thesis. As a consequence, certain ‘grey 
literature’ in the form of blog entries and news articles were used, both of which fall outside of the 
classical source for scientific publications. Wherever possible, more verifiable sources such as journal 
articles, professional research institutions and working papers were used. To conclude, this paper 
should be considered as a conceptual paper where literature review and desk research leads to the 




2 Understanding the technology 
 Before blockchain 
Before the advent of blockchain technology, creating and enforcing trust between transacting parties 
always required a third-party such as a bank. To understand how blockchain creates trust, it is 
important to examine the current system of accounting and its origins as, at its core, blockchain is 
simply a new form of ledger-keeping. The current form of ledger-keeping, known as the double-entry 
bookkeeping method, is a 14th-century product of Luca Pacioli, a Franciscan friar and mathematician 
(Yamey, 2005; Smith, 2013). It enabled the use of Arabic numerals, allowed merchants to reliably keep 
records, and gave bankers the ability to act as middlemen in the international payment system (Lee, 
2013). However, the impact of the double-entry system was greater than simply laying down the 
foundations of modern finance as it also influenced the culture of finance (Lee, 2013; Coate & 
Mitschow, 2018). Pacioli believed his method to be more than just an accounting tool, viewing it also 
as a moral obligation (Coate & Mitschow, 2018). The concept of moral obligation is inherent in the 
double-entry system as it requires that any inflow have an equal outflow, i.e., a debit (asset) for a 
credit (liability), thereby achieving balance between the values (Pacioli & Cripps, 1994). Over the 
following centuries, clean books became a sign of honesty, further entrenching the banker’s role as a 
payment intermediary and increasing the circulation of money (Lee, 2013). 
Although in many cases intermediaries do remain effective and honest at supplying the correct 
information, in practice, the double-entry system still falls victim to fraud. There are also many 
instances where honesty cannot be assumed and where inducements may exist for intermediaries to 
supply an ineffective service or to act dishonestly. Dishonesty may be voluntary if the intermediary is 
intentionally untruthful, such as the case of Cambridge Analytica1 accessing data from Facebook 
(Schyff, Flowerday & Furnell, 2020), or may be unintentional, such as when the network owned by the 
intermediary is breached, as was the case with Yahoo, Sony, and JP Morgan Chase (Sloane, 2011; 
Telang, 2015). Moreover, even when data and verification processes remain intact, financial 
middlemen are considered indispensable, turning intermediaries into gatekeepers (Huang, Li & Shi, 
2020). 
Blockchain’s real potential is that it enables a drastic reduction in the cost of forming trust using a new 
decentralised accounting method (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; Liu, Wu & Xu, 2019; Sinha, 2020). By 
extension, blockchain allows for the creation of new types and structures of economic organisations 
(Casey & Vigna, 2018; Lee, 2019; Weking et al., 2020). A new bookkeeping standard may appear to be 
 
1 A firm that was affiliated with the 2017 Trump Presidency Campaign and which collected personal data from 




dull and of limited significance, yet for thousands of years, ledgers have formed the bedrock of 
western civilisation (Mukhametzyanov, Nugaev & Muhametzyanova, 2017). Western society functions 
on trusting the claims of others as to what they own, what they are owed, and what they owe. This 
trust can only be achieved using a system that is accepted by everyone to keep track of transactions. 
This system, for centuries, has been the double-entry method. 
 
 Blockchain’s beginnings 
On 31 October 2008, a paper authored by Satoshi Nakamoto and titled ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System’ was posted to a cryptography mailing list (Nakamoto, 2008a). The paper 
proposed methods of using peer-to-peer technology to create ‘a system for electronic transactions 
without relying on trust’ (Nakamoto, 2008b). On 3 January 2009, the Bitcoin protocol was released 
and the genesis block of bitcoin (block number 0) was mined by Satoshi Nakamoto himself. Although 
Satoshi did not coin the term ‘blockchain’, its principles (discussed in the next section) were laid out 
in this 2008 paper. 
Bitcoin’s popularity started to increase after 2011, when Silk Road, the Bitcoin-powered black 
marketplace for illegal drugs was exposed (Barratt et al., 2016; Krugman, 2018; Jawaheri et al., 2020). 
Two years later, Bitcoin’s market capitalisation had exceeded $1 billion (CoinMarketCap, 2018). 
Notably, the second largest blockchain platform that operates today, Ethereum, was launched in 2013 
(Buterin, 2013). Unlike Bitcoin which only records currency transactions, Ethereum also allows 
computer programs called smart contracts to be recorded on the blockchain (Buterin, 2013). Smart 
contracts are self-executing computer code that enables complex operations using tokens to be 
conducted (Xu & Zou, 2020). What makes these contracts ‘smart’ is not that they are automated, but 
that they are carried out on a decentralised blockchain network, assuring all transacting parties that 
the contract will be completed without the need of an intermediary (Macrinici, Cartofeanu & Gao, 
2018; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019). Blockchain’s popularity continued to increase as shown by 
Gartner’s 2016 hype curve which saw blockchain near the top on the curve, placing it in the “peak of 
inflated expectations” category (Gartner, 2016). By 2017, Gartner placed blockchain in its ‘Top ten 
strategic technology trends’ (Gartner, 2017). The result was excitement as well as misconceptions, 





 Deciphering blockchain 
Blockchains are a network of physical computers that all work together to form a single virtual 
computer. The gain from blockchains, unlike a traditional computer, is that they produce trust through 
cryptographic rules. Each ‘block’ in the blockchain has three primary inputs: data, the current hash, 
and the previous hash (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019; Bamakan, Motavali & Babaei Bondarti, 
2020). A hash acts the fingerprint for each block assigning a unique identifier number. The hash is 
calculated based on mathematical rules using the data inside the block. The block also contains the 
hash of the previous block, acting as the linkage between each block. Any changes to the block will 
change the hash number. Therefore, any attempted changes to the data inside a block will prove 
invalid as the hash numbers will no longer match (Zheng et al., 2017). Multiple transactions are then 
stored together per block, up to a certain size, and chained together, hence the term blockchain, using 
cryptographic locks, all of which are an outcome of the consensus protocol (Crosby et al., 2016; 
Alvseike et al., 2017; Kakushadze & Russo, 2018). If set up correctly, the result is an immutable, shared 
record of the truth that cannot be erased (Crosby et al., 2016; Casey & Vigna, 2018). 
At its core, a blockchain is a distributed database of records, transactions or digital events that been 
concluded and shared amongst participants (Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019). For the first time, 
blockchain allows unconnected people to transact safely and securely without the need for a third 
party to verify the transaction (Cai et al., 2019). It performs this function by being a public, permanent, 
append-only, and distributed ledger (Mike Orcutt, 2018; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019). These terms 
are further defined below: 
• Public: blockchains are accessible to anyone, meaning the database forms part of public 
information. 
• Permanent: It is almost impossible to tamper with data encoded in a blockchain, assuming 
the latter has been correctly set up. 
• Append-only: Previous transactions cannot be amended in a blockchain, only new ones can 
be added. 
• Distributed: No single entity owns or controls a public blockchain. Instead, a network of 
computers maintains and secures the database, and each participant or ‘node’ stores a copy. 
• Ledger: At its core, a blockchain is a new type of ledger. For example, Bitcoin’s blockchain 
tracks bitcoin currency balances. 
Blockchain may be an answer to the early 1980s computer science problem known as the Byzantine 
Generals Problem (Lamport, Shostak & Pease, 1982), which concerned how consensus between 




De Filippi, 2015; Kuo et al., 2020; Sheikh et al., 2020). Historically, there have been three different 
approaches to answering this question (Mike Orcutt, 2018):  
• Enforcement (past): The threat of force was used to enforce early exchanges of value in 
civilizations.  
• Institutions (present): Central authorities such as governments and banks emerged, 
facilitating organised outsourced trust (assuming these authorities could be trusted).  
• Networks (future): Powered by blockchain, trust is distributed by a network of computers that 
can automate trust in a way previously impossible. These networks may also be thought of as 
‘decentralised’ institutions.  
Therefore, what makes blockchain unique as a ledger is that instead of the ledger being managed and 
stored by a single centralised institution, such as a bank or government department, multiple copies 
exist on multiple independent computers within a decentralised network. No single entity on the 
network controls the ledger. All computers on the network may propose changes to the ledger. 
However, these changes are only accepted into the ledger according to strict rules determined by the 
‘consensus protocol’. The consensus protocol is a cryptographic algorithm that requires a majority 
vote from all computers on the network before any changes can be made to the ledger (Bamakan, 
Motavali & Babaei Bondarti, 2020). Once a majority has been agreed for any changes, the copies of 
the ledger stored on each computer are updated simultaneously. 
The consensus protocol differs between today’s largest blockchains. Bitcoin and Ethereum use Proof 
of Work (PoW), Ripple uses Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) and EOS uses Delegated Proof 
of Stake (DPoS). PBFT and DPoS were developed to overcome PoW’s shortcomings (Lee, 2019). 
However, each consensus protocol still has trade-offs, something that is referred to as the 
‘impossibility trinity’. That is, currently, no blockchain can ensure correctness, decentralisation and 
cost-efficiency at the same time (Abadi & Brunnermeier, 2018).  
• Proof of Work (PoW) is the original consensus protocol proposed by Nakamoto (2008a). This 
method requires a complex and computationally demanding mathematical puzzle (known as 
a nonce) to be solved resulting in the block’s hash (Salimitari & Chatterjee, 2018). Advantages 
of PoW is its highly secure and decentralised nature. Its disadvantages, however, is the high 
energy requirement (O’Dwyer & Malone, 2014; de Vries, 2018; Bondarev, 2020; Das & Dutta, 
2020), low throughput and transaction speed (Milutinovic et al., 2016; Xu & Zou, 2020), and 
that it requires special hardware to run (Zheng et al., 2017; Alsunaidi & Alhaidari, 2019). The 
scalability of PoW over large networks is also of concern (Croman et al., 2016; Poon & Dryja, 




within PoW networks, however, it remains a work in progress (O’Leary, 2017; Zheng et al., 
2017). Potential solutions include the use of off-chain (outside the blockchain network) and 
on-chain methods (Bano, Al-Bassam & Danezis, 2017). 
• Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) requires all nodes to participate in the voting 
process of adding new blocks. Consensus is achieved when two-thirds of the nodes agree on 
the block. PBFT requires that a minimum of four nodes must be in agreement, meaning an 
individual malicious node will automatically be rejected (Lee, 2019). As such, consensus is 
agreed faster and more efficiently compared to PoW (Salimitari & Chatterjee, 2018). PBFT’s 
advantages are, therefore, its energy efficiency and high throughput. Its disadvantages are its 
lack of scalability and the requirement for all nodes to vote, which introduces potential delays 
in transactions. 
• The Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) method was proposed by Larimer (2014). It builds upon 
the Proof of Stake (PoS) method where the creator of a new block is chosen randomly based 
on the size of their stake in the network and age of their stake. DPoS improves on PoS by 
introducing the use of representatives in the voting process to validate blocks (Bashir, 2017). 
The number of representatives is limited to ensure that the network is efficient. The 
advantages are energy efficiency, scalability and low transaction costs. The disadvantage of 
this method is its semi-centralised structure (Salimitari & Chatterjee, 2018), however there 
are governance mechanisms in place that allow nodes to correct for mistakes or delays made 
by representatives (Zheng et al., 2017). Nevertheless, DPoS is more suitable in private 
blockchains. 
Korpela, Hallikas & Dahlberg (2017) classify blockchain into three categories: public, private and 
consortium blockchains. The three types of blockchains tend to reach consensus in different ways. For 
example, public blockchains require all nodes to participate. Public blockchains are the focus of 
discussion in this study. Private and consortium blockchains, however, can reach consensus by only 
using a select number of nodes. 
• Public blockchains are permissionless and decentralised blockchains whereby all participants 
can participate and access the information stored on the network. Bitcoin and Ethereum are 
both examples. Public blockchains are viewed as the most secure due to the decentralised 
consensus amongst all nodes. Consensus protocols used on public blockchains include PoW 
and PoS.  
• Consortium blockchains or federated blockchains allow all participants to access the 
information on the network however any changes or additions are decided by a select group 




idea is to distribute decision power amongst a few participants instead of in a single authority 
to help make unbiased decisions. Some examples include B3i2 (Insurance), EWF3 (Energy) and 
R34 (Banking). 
• Private blockchains are permissioned blockchains in which information is only accessible for 
pre-selected participants and changes can also only be made by an authorised group. Private 
blockchains are centralised in the sense that a single authority determines consensus. It is for 
this reason that private blockchains are often rather referred to as ‘Distributed Ledgers’ as 
they do not share the core decentralised principles of blockchains (Morkunas, Paschen & 
Boon, 2019). The primary motivation for private blockchains are situations where corporates 
are concerned about giving competitors visibility over their transactions (O’Leary, 2017).  
 
 Applications of blockchain 
The development of blockchain can be characterised by the following four stages (Swan, 2015; Leon 
Zhao, Fan & Yan, 2017; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019): 
• Blockchain 1.0: focused on financial transactions. Cryptocurrencies were the primary 
focal point, with applications in digital payments systems such as remittances and 
currency transfer. The best-known example is Bitcoin. Such cryptocurrencies have 
experienced high volatility in their prices, limiting their effectiveness as payment tools (Xu 
& Zou, 2020). 
• Blockchain 2.0: builds on Blockchain 1.0 and adds elements such as privacy, smart 
contracts and non-native tokens. Ethereum is the most well-known example.  
• Blockchain 3.0: refers to digital society and incorporates decentralized applications 
(dApp) (Lee, 2019). These apps share the same properties as blockchains and have a built-
in incentivization mechanism (Raval, 2016). The objective was to offer applications that 
look and feel like today’s web apps, but that would be powered by decentralised 
cryptonetworks instead of individual company servers. 
The potential of blockchain has received significant attention, however, the actual applications are 
still being tested and developed (Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019). A review of recent research reveals 
four fields of focus. First is financial services (Underwood, 2016), particularly in relation to banking, 
auditing and accounting (Wang & Kogan, 2018; Liu, Wu & Xu, 2019; Tan & Low, 2019; Sinha, 2020). By 
 
2 See: https://b3i.tech/home.html 
3 See: https://www.energyweb.org/ 




not requiring a trusted intermediary, firms can significantly lower transaction costs (Nowiński & 
Kozma, 2017). Cross border payments are also able to benefit from the short transaction time and 
without needing to charge a currency conversion fee (Weking et al., 2020).  
Second, research efforts have focused on the supply chain. Reyna et al. (2018) believe that 
blockchain’s impact on the supply chain shows the most potential value outside of financial 
applications of the technology. A ledger powered by blockchain would enable all members of a supply 
chain to track, trace and identify any object moving through the supply chain (Grewal, Motyka & Levy, 
2018; Xu et al., 2018; Min, 2019). The transparent, verifiable, and shared nature of a blockchain ledger 
would help eliminate redundancies in the supply chain and enable the use of connected devices 
(Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016; Zhang et al., 2020) 
Third, relates to blockchain and multi-sided marketplaces (Glaser, 2017). In these marketplaces, a 
trusted intermediary is ordinarily needed to ensure fair and honest transactions can occur (Hein et al., 
2019). This includes platform intermediaries such as Google, Amazon or Apple (Hein et al., 2019). 
Blockchain, however, removes the need for an intermediary through a decentralised consensus 
protocol (Ying, Jia & Du, 2018). These technology changes are driving disintermediation (Xu et al., 
2018) and decentralisation (Swan, 2017). At the same time, low efficiency and high transaction costs 
could become a thing of the past (Ying, Jia & Du, 2018). 
Fourth, there has been a concerted research effort into the social welfare benefits of blockchain (Jiao 
et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018). The decentralised nature of blockchain can allow for the automation, 
conclusion and enforcement of contracting services (Cong & He, 2019). Any market participant can 
prove their legitimacy and conduct transactions without information asymmetry (Xu & Zou, 2020). 
Examples of this include the voting system (Kshetri & Voas, 2018) and within the healthcare system 
(Mettler, 2016; Drosatos & Kaldoudi, 2019), including sharing and storing patient data (Smith & 
Dhillon, 2017; Swan, 2017). 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the mechanisms through which blockchains ‘create’ trust and indeed the 
importance of trust creation. Reliance on systems such as the double-entry accounting method and 
the expectation that centralised institutions will remain honest has proved an expensive assumption, 
especially in recent years. This is what makes the prospect of blockchain so attractive. For the first 
time, trust can be created in a decentralised environment. Furthermore, by leveraging cryptography, 
blockchains can prevent any alterations to transactions while avoiding the issues of centralised 




performance and scalability issues, as indicated by the trade-offs of the different types of blockchains 
and consensus protocols. The technology, though, is still in its early years and is certain to experience 
significant changes in the future (Sinha, 2020). Advancements in the technology are already evident 
by the introduction of new consensus protocols which look to correct for the shortfalls of Proof of 
Work. Recent research efforts indicate a focus on tackling the technical properties of blockchain 
(Nakamoto, 2008a; Eyal & Sirer, 2018; Wang & Kogan, 2018) or investigating the possible benefits of 
the technology for various industries, including financial services, supply chains, multi-sided 
marketplaces and healthcare (Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017; Kshetri & Voas, 2018; Radanović & Likić, 2018). 
However, research on the impact of blockchain on firms’ business models remains relatively thin. A 




3 Introducing cryptonetworks 
In Chapter 2, the origins of blockchain, its potential advantages, and the way the technology functions 
were outlined. Here, we examine one of the key applications of blockchain technology: 
cryptonetworks. Cryptonetworks (or token economies/ecosystems), such as the Ethereum platform, 
are created through the combination of blockchain technology and tokens (Figure 2 below). Tokens 
are distinct virtual ‘currency’ tokens that exist on their own blockchain (e.g., ETH on Ethereum). More 






Figure 2: Cryptonetworks: blockchain and tokens 
 
The pre-blockchain internet connected providers of information with consumers who used it. The 
blockchain-based internet, however, looks to create an internet that prioritises the sharing of value 
created by its users, and in turn, the reshaping business models through transparency and authenticity 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). Business models are a “description and architecture of how a firm creates, 
delivers, and captures value” (Teece, 2010; Weking et al., 2020). Cryptonetworks have the potential 
to reshuffle economic activities, reduce transaction costs and significantly strengthen the trust 
between actors in an ecosystem (Weking et al., 2020). Cryptonetworks and the underlying blockchain 
technology could bring about significant changes to business models of today enabling new products 
and services (Lansiti & Lakhani, 2017; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019; Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 
2019; Tönnissen, Beinke & Teuteberg, 2020). 
 
 Cryptonetworks impact on business models  
Central to the operating structure of a firm is its business model. The power of technology to alter 
business models is historically evident (Teece, 2010) and plays an important role in developing 
competitive advantage (Chesbrough, 2010; Baden-Fuller & Haefliger, 2013). In particular, it is 
interesting to discuss cost structure in the context of business models and how this may be disrupted. 




Pigneur, 2013:40). In the financial services sector alone, PwC estimates the cost savings as a result of 
blockchain to be between $15-20 billion by 2022 (Di Gregorio, 2017).  
Historically, the pipeline business model has been the model of choice for the largest companies in 
the world. In this model, a company purchases raw material, use the materials to build products, and 
then sells the products to its customers (Tönnissen, Beinke & Teuteberg, 2020). In the pipeline model, 
value creation occurs internally and between firms (Jacobides, Cennamo & Gawer, 2018). However, 
the digital transformation of the global economy has brought new business models to the forefront. 
Namely, the platform business model where value is realised through the creations of the community 
in the ecosystem. Such platforms are on the rise and their prevalence is expected to continue to grow 
(Han, Martinez & Neely, 2018; Lamarre & May, 2018). Today seven of the 12 biggest companies 
operate as a platform: Apple, Alphabet (Google), Microsoft, Amazon, Alibaba, Tencent and to some 
degree, Facebook (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016; McKinsey, 2020). Smedlund et al. (2018) believe that 
these platform business models have radically altered our economy and possibly even society.  
Cryptonetworks look to build upon, disrupt (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019; Prewett, Prescott & 
Phillips, 2020; Tönnissen, Beinke & Teuteberg, 2020; Weking et al., 2020) and potentially form entirely 
new business models (Lansiti & Lakhani, 2017; Kshetri & Voas, 2018; Lacity, 2018; Wang & Kogan, 
2018). Blockchain offers several benefits over traditional models depending on its implementation 
(Wörner et al., 2016; Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; Subramanian, 2017). These include transaction cost 
reductions as a result of disintermediation (Xu et al., 2017; Ying, Jia & Du, 2018; Cai et al., 2019), 
speedier transactions (Underwood, 2016), improved tractability and verification of records 
(Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019). Assets are also able to be authenticated without the need for an 
intermediary (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017).  
All transactions are encrypted and in combination with decentralisation, blockchains provide security 
whilst ensuring participants can trust each other (Underwood, 2016; Zhu & Zhou, 2016). This means 
that ownership can be transferred without the need for an intermediary (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 
2019). Ownership is reflected through tokens, which act as a value unit in the ecosystem “to self-
govern its business model, and empower its users to interact with its products, while facilitating the 
distribution and sharing of rewards and benefits to all of its stakeholders” (Mougayar, 2017). The 
transfer of tokens between network participants corresponds to the transfer of property rights (Xu & 
Zou, 2020). Tokens also offer three unique features in the formation of an ecosystem (Oliveira et al., 
2018). First, tokens enable the transfer of value between ecosystem participants and can be divided 
into small numbers (Pilkington, 2016; Dai & Vasarhelyi, 2017). Second, tokens act as an incentivisation 




in the ecosystem which is needed to reach a critical mass of users (Rouviere, 2016; Wenger, 2016; 
Chen, 2018; Oliveira et al., 2018). Interestingly, blockchain’s impact may also extend beyond well-
established models into industries that struggle with structural issues. An example is the real estate 
industry where illiquidity in the market acts as a structural bottleneck. Illiquidity is the result of two 
primary reasons: lack of trust and long closing times (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017), both of which 
blockchain has the potential to address. To better understand the advantages that cryptonetworks 
have over firms and their existing business models, an exploration of transaction cost theory is 
needed. 
 
 Transaction cost theory: the firm and the market 
In the pivotal paper The Nature of the Firm, Coase laid the foundations of an entirely new branch of 
microeconomics known as the ‘theory of the firm’, winning him the 1991 Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences (Coase, 1937). The Nature of the Firm was written in response to economic theory 
practitioners at the time who, according to Coase, lacked a clear understanding of its assumptions. 
Coase believed that understanding a theory’s underlying assumptions was not only important to avoid 
misunderstandings, but also to allow its valid selection above competing assumptions. In particular, 
the meaning of the word ‘firm’ in the field of economics may differ from its meaning in everyday use. 
Various interpretations of ‘firm’ resulted from economic analysis starting with an individual firm and 
not the entire industry. Coase, therefore, aimed to define the ‘firm’ in the real world using the idea 
of substitution at the margin.  
In search of the definition of a firm, Coase first questioned the definition of the economic system. One 
view is that the economic system is coordinated by the price mechanism, with society thus considered 
not an organisation but an organism (Salter, 1921; Hayek, 1933). The economic system, therefore 
‘works itself’ by functioning automatically without external intervention. Individuals still exercise 
some degree of planning by choosing between alternatives, but the direction of resources is directly 
dependent on the price mechanism. However, the economic system described by Salter is incomplete 
as economic theory implies that the allocation of factors of production between different uses is 
determined by the price mechanism. Thus, if the price of factor A becomes higher in use case X than 
that in Y, factor A will shift from Y to X. In the real world, however, the price mechanism is not always 
enough to coordinate factors of production, as a worker may move from department X to Y not 
because of a change in relative price, but because he is ordered to do so. In response to this, Marshall 




(Marshall, 1890), Clark introduced the entrepreneur to explain coordination via orders (Clark, 1928), 
and Knight suggested the role of the manager to coordinate workers via orders (Knight, 1921). 
Therefore, outside of firms, prices dictate production decisions and coordination occurs through a 
sequence of transactions in the market. However, when operating inside a firm, market transactions 
are replaced by entrepreneur-dictated production decisions. It is therefore clear that the market and 
the firm offer alternative production co-ordinating options. However, from the perspective of Salter, 
the price mechanism (market) is all that is needed for production, thus calling into question the need 
for the firm. 
Coase argued that firms were needed over the market because of the costs of the price mechanism, 
and listed three specific types of transaction costs. First, there is a cost in determining (discovering) 
the relevant prices of production (Kaldor, 1933) and although such costs are not eliminated entirely 
within the firm, they are reduced. Second, costs exist in negotiating and concluding contracts needed 
for each transaction occurring in the market (Usher, 1920). As with discovery costs, negotiating costs 
are reduced but not entirely eliminated within firms. Third, firms allow for the creation and correct 
enforcement of long-term contracts, which may be desirable to those looking to avoid the costs of 
negotiating and enforcing a series of short-term contracts. Therefore, the firm is only more efficient 
than the market if the transaction costs entailed in obtaining factors of production are lower cost than 
those entailed in the acquisition of the same factors of production in the market. If the entrepreneur 
of the firm is unsuccessful, transacting participants are always able to revert back to the market. 
However, operating a firm at costs lower than those of the market cannot be guaranteed and 
therefore, without the uncertainty of the extent of transaction costs, the firm would not exist (Coase, 
1937).  
Considering this, Coase (1937:386-405) described three types of costs that are incurred when 
transacting with an external party on the open market: 
1. Search and information costs: finding the lowest priced supplier for a job 
2. Bargaining and decision costs: negotiating an agreement with the desired supplier 
3. Policing and enforcement costs: ensuring the job completed by the supplier is of agreed-upon 
quality 
These market transactions are reduced by the firm in the following ways: 
1. Search costs: there is a greater flow of information within firms and the entrepreneur is better 




2. Bargaining costs: employees (suppliers) are already under contract and the entrepreneur, 
therefore, does not need to formally negotiate each task but can instead directly give orders 
3. Enforcement costs: the threat of demotion, lower bonuses, and job loss ensures that 
employees (suppliers) follow orders and complete the job to sufficient quality 
Moreover, firms are incentivised to ‘internalise’ transactions to remove any uncertainties over price 
and quality (Hennart, 1986; Love, 1997; Kaplan, 2012). For example, a beer company who owns its 
breweries, public houses, and suppliers may protect itself from any issues associated with sourcing 
the cheapest prices and negotiating contracts with suppliers and retailers, and in addition, the firm 
may enforce internal quality controls.  
Two final factors may further impact transaction costs:  
• Bounded rationality: individuals have finite decision-making power because of the cognitive 
restrictions of the human mind, time constraints, and the information available regarding the 
decision. It is for this reason that contracts are incomplete by nature and are filled with 
exceptions, requiring a judicial system to settle any disputes (Xu & Zou, 2020). However, 
bounded rationality does not apply only to individuals but also to firms. Firms may select 
prices and product characteristics with the intention of exploiting certain behavioural biases 
(Ellison, 2006), including hyperbolic discounting (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004; Della Vigna 
& Malmendier, 2006), loss aversion (Heidhues & Koszegi, 2004), and fairness (Rotemberg, 
2011). 
• Opportunism: individuals tend to act in their own best interests, thus introducing additional 
uncertainty in dealings between transacting parties (Nooteboom, 1996). 
The severity of bounded rationality and opportunism will inform a firm on whether to expand 
internally (via vertical integration) or to transact with external parties (via the market), often known 
as the ‘make-or-buy decision’ (Jauch & Wilson, 1979). This is dependent on the following variables 
(Williamson, 1973, 1975): 
• Frequency: the greater the frequency of transactions, the greater the costs of operating via 
the market (because of constant negotiation, bargaining, and search costs) 
• Uncertainty: the longer the contract, the greater the uncertainty 
• Asset specificity: the degree to which an asset can be used for multiple purposes (i.e., its 
fungibility). The less specific the asset is, the fewer transactions required. 
The trade-off between the transaction cost efficiency of the firm and the incentive maximisation 




trade-off is linear and inversely related, and a transaction may therefore either benefit from reduced 











Figure 3: Trade-off between transaction costs and incentive maximisation between the firm and 
market (source: Wang, 2018) 
 
Thus far, our discussion on transaction costs has remained limited to exogenous transactions costs, or 
costs that are incurred by the firm in engaging with parties or acquiring products and services outside 
the firm. The alternative is the acquisition of the same products and services within the firm, resulting 
in endogenous transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are internal to a firm when transactions occur between departments or business 
units within the same firm, and which are headed by directors or managers. The same concepts of 
bounded rationality and opportunism also motivate any decision made by directors and managers. 
Therefore, by once again applying Williamson’s economic formula on calculating behaviour 
surrounding decisions, this time in the context of endogenous transactions costs, the following 
questions are of relevance: 
• Frequency: is dishonest behaviour commonplace within the firm’s culture?  
• Uncertainty: how likely is the manager to be caught for dishonest behaviour? 




The level of monitoring and enforcement needed on a firm’s management will vary according to the 
answers provided to the above questions. Naturally and as with exogenous transactions, any form of 
opportunistic behaviour within a firm will also have negative consequences on its financing and 
strategy (Kaplan, 2012). Thus, firms are motivated to put governance and monitoring controls in place 
to minimise the costs of bounded rationality and opportunism, thereby limiting the frequency, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity of internal transactions. 
Alchian & Demsetz (1972) built on the idea of monitoring the costs of a firm and highlighted the 
necessity of monitoring costs within team environments. For instance, assume Firm A comprises three 
teams, each working on a separate project. Despite working on different projects, the three teams are 
likely to require similar, shared inputs to complete each of their projects, including technology 
infrastructure such as internet access and printing services and areas such as boardrooms for the team 
to meet and brainstorm. Without monitoring, one team could prevent the other two from using the 
meeting rooms by using these for the full working day. Therefore, when shared inputs are needed, 
the firm should ensure the most efficient arrangement for all teams to access the internet, printers, 
and meeting rooms. 
 
 Cryptonetworks – enabling new cost structures 
Cryptonetworks may be thought of as a bridge between the market and the firm. Although 
cryptonetworks are not suitable for all situations, they supply an alternative that pushes out the trade-
off boundary between transaction costs and incentives (Figure 3 – pg22). When cryptonetworks are 
considered, the trade-off relationship shifts from a linear graph to a concave curve (Figure 4 – pg24) 
as, like markets, cryptonetworks allow participants to conduct economic activities without a central 
decision-maker via economic incentivisation mechanisms (O’Leary, 2017; Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 
2019). And like the firm, cryptonetworks also reduce transaction costs (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; 
Angelis & Ribeiro da Silva, 2019; Cai et al., 2019; Weking et al., 2020). The concave shape therefore 
represents increased opportunity costs for firms and markets with cryptonetworks providing a middle 
ground. Thus, cryptonetworks can mitigate transaction costs while maintaining the incentive 













Figure 4: Improved trade-off between transaction costs and incentive maximisation associated with 
cryptonetworks (source: Wang, 2018) 
 
Cryptonetworks distort the line between the market and the firm by lowering all three categories of 
transaction costs, according to Coase, in the following ways: 
1. Search and information costs 
Blockchain technology enables cryptonetworks to reduce search and information costs via simplified 
information exchange (public domain) and trust (consensus protocols) (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 
2019). This information, which is forever stored in a publicly accessible, auditable, and immutable 
ledger, reduces information asymmetry (Xu & Zou, 2020) and enables easier and cheaper transactions 
as parties are confident in the accuracy of the information accessed. Also, because of their structure, 
cryptonetworks inherently benefit from network effects and network economies, and each network 
participant benefits from additional participants joining the network (Rouviere, 2016; Wenger, 2016; 
Chen, 2018; Oliveira et al., 2018), thus increasing the demand for the cryptonetworks’ native token 
and causing its value to increase (Wenger, 2016; Chen, 2018; Wang, 2018). 
Taiwanese start-up BioIPSeeds5 is a blockchain-based peer-to-peer platform for Biomedical IP sharing. 
The company helps researchers freely exchange ideas. Researchers can upload their IP summary 
(research idea) to find research and funding partners. The platform secures and notarises any sensitive 
 




data through blockchain. If a research partner is found, information can only be shared using the 
platform’s encryption and decryption processes and all transactions are securely recorded in the 
blockchain (Lee, 2019). 
 
2. Bargaining and decision costs 
Bargaining is the process of discovering price, or what each participant is willing to pay (WTP) and 
willing to accept (WTA) (Condorelli, 2013). Because there are multiple participants and information is 
imperfect and asymmetric (one party is often better informed than the other), bargaining is a costly 
and time-consuming process that is replete with miscommunications (Julius & DiGiovanni Jr, 2016). 
Cryptonetworks streamline discovery (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019) and improve operational 
efficiencies (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; Weking et al., 2020; Xu & Zou, 2020) by using open-source 
software (terms are open and known by all), open data, and auction techniques that further eliminate 
information asymmetry. Cryptonetworks also remove manual processes, shorten authorisation holds 
and therefore increase transaction speeds (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019). In the case of private 
blockchains, transaction speeds are decreased to microseconds (IBM, 2018). 
Walmart in partnership with IBM launched a blockchain-enabled food tracing system to improve food 
security. This system reduced the time needed to trace food from its origin from seven days to a few 
seconds; allowing Walmart to recall products quickly (Morkunas, Paschen & Boon, 2019). 
 
3. Policing and enforcement costs 
Traditionally, contracts have been enforced by laws of contract, which may be national or multilateral. 
In the case of cryptonetworks, decentralised consensus protocols, which are not limited to national 
borders, and embedded logic are used to enforce contracts. Cryptonetworks connect consumers, 
suppliers and all other market participants directly, reducing errors and conflicts in contracts through 
smart contracts (Lee, 2019). 
The SyncFab platform6 links buyers and manufacturers in the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
parts procurement process. SyncFab reduces the time and costs of sourcing OEM parts; the platform 
also enforces anti-counterfeit measures, recalls and automated settlement. 
 
 




Finally, the last two factors that can further alter transaction costs and the implications of 
cryptonetworks are:  
• Bounded rationality: Although cognitive and time limitations still exist in the context of 
cryptonetworks, information availability and reliability are significantly greater than on the 
market because of the transparent and immutable nature of blockchain transactions (Xu & 
Zou, 2020). Similarly, individual biases such as hyperbolic discounting, loss aversion, and 
fairness still exist, but their impact on transaction costs are reduced in the context of 
cryptonetworks.  
• Opportunism: Because ownership of the cryptonetwork is shared via the use of the native 
network token, individuals are jointly incentivised to increase the value of the network 
(Wenger, 2016; Burniske, 2018). Therefore, uncertainty in dealings between transacting 
parties is also substantially reduced in comparison to that in the market. 
Cryptonetworks also have an impact on the variables that influence bounded rationality and 
opportunism, specifically: 
• Frequency: Although the frequency of transactions in cryptonetworks may be high, the cost 
of these transactions is mitigated by removing the need for constant negotiations, bargaining, 
and search efforts, as transactions are cryptographically enforced and transparent. 
• Uncertainty: Because transactions are cryptographically enforced, the length of a contract 
within a cryptonetwork does not result in greater uncertainty. The length of the contract could 
be two weeks or two years and both would be enforceable with equal levels of certainty. Due 
to cryptography, transacting parties can rely on the absolute enforceable nature of 
cryptonetwork contracts regardless of the contract length. 
• Asset specificity: Except for a few cryptonetworks, most tokens are designed to be fungible, 
so that the same token may be used for any type of transaction. For example, the ETH token 
can be used for any type of transaction on the Ethereum platform, including payments and 
governance votes.7 Furthermore, one token may be exchanged for another (e.g., BTC for ETH) 
to enable the seamless interoperability of different network tokens. Finally, tokens are 
infinitely divisible and can be ‘broken down’ to smaller fractions, thus highlighting their 
extremely low asset specificity. 
 
 
7 It should be noted that certain cryptonetworks have a separate governance token. However, the 
interchangeability of the governance token and use of the ‘standard’ token is possible through a single 




 Why decentralisation is needed 
Cryptonetworks will not always represent the optimal option in response to all cost inefficiencies; they 
are best suited to services that excel in decentralised environments (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; 
Burniske, 2018) as only these can provide the adequate organisation and alignment of incentives for 
network participants. Without decentralisation, actors in a network may be tempted to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour mentioned above. Decentralised environments, however, align incentives so 
that all participants may benefit from increased network value (Rouviere, 2016; Wenger, 2016; Chen, 
2018; Oliveira et al., 2018), thus reducing opportunistic tendencies.  
The advantage of decentralisation becomes apparent when comparing the cost of using the current 
system of ensuring trust. An excellent example is that of the Lehman Brothers, who in 2007 recorded 
record profits, all of which had been fully audited by Ernst & Young (Wiggins, Bennett & Metrick, 2014; 
Calida & Katina, 2015). Nine months later, however, came the largest financial economic crisis in 80 
years, forcing the 158-year-old company to file for bankruptcy (Katina et al., 2019). Evidently, the 
records of the years before the collapse had not been correct. Upon further investigation, it was 
discovered that the Lehman Brothers were not the only guilty party, with banks in the United States 
and Europe also being forced to pay billion-dollar fines to settle the costs of producing inflated balance 
sheets (Casey & Vigna, 2018). 
The 2008 economic crash is an extreme example of the cost of trust, or lack thereof (Calida & Katina, 
2015; Katina et al., 2019). But it is not the only example, as other areas of our economy exist purely 
to create trust in current records. Accountancy is one example of a profession solely dedicated to 
creating trust in external records. The job of accountants is to reconcile firm ledgers and their expertise 
is only needed as business counterparts do not inherently trust each other’s ledgers. The current job 
of accountants is therefore expensive and time-consuming but is a necessity.  
The cost of trust is also evidenced by what the current centralised system prevents. Companies such 
as Google, Facebook, and Amazon have used economies of scale and network effects to create 
monopolies (Chen, 2018; Dixon, 2018; Cowen, 2019). These networks have provided billions of users 
access to powerful, free technologies at the cost of massive monopolised user data silos. The cost of 
companies building massive user data silos goes beyond just privacy concerns. The true costs are 
revealed by analysing the lifecycle of centralised platforms (Figure 6 below) and the problematic 




Figure 6: Centralised network shifts in power structures in relation to network growth (source: Dixon, 
2018) 
 
At the start of a centralised platform’s lifecycle, its priority is to attract users and third parties, 
including developers and businesses (Dixon, 2018), and this is associated with network effects (Chen, 
2018). The more users a network comprises, the more useful the network becomes for other users 
and developers alike, thus increasing its overall value (Rouviere, 2016; Wenger, 2016; Chen, 2018; 
Oliveira et al., 2018). As network adoption increases, the platform’s influence over these new users 
and third parties also rises (Figure 6 above). Until this stage, the relationship between the centralised 
platform and its network participants is a positive-sum game as neither the platform nor the 
participants benefit at the expense of the other. Therefore, during its infancy, a platform such as a 
social media network requires additional users and developers to grow, thus benefiting the owners of 
the platform (via increased revenues), network users (via the use of the platform’s services), and 
developers (via revenue generated by reaching new users) (Wenger, 2016; Chen, 2018; Wang, 2018).  
However, the relationship between the platform and its participants changes to a zero-sum game once 
the top of the S-curve shown above in Figure 6 is reached. As at this point, the platform has gained 
enough users and developers for it to render impractical the use of alternative platforms supplying 
similar services. Users are essentially ‘locked-in’ to the network as all social peers use the same 
platform, and developers are similarly ‘locked-in’ as the users of their apps are on the platform. 
Examples of such cases include Facebook, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, and Instagram. Therefore, the 
platform no longer has to explicitly attract additional participants as network effects have become so 
strong that new participants join spontaneously. Thus, further growth of the platform is achieved by 
extracting data from users and competing with platform complements over users and profits (Dixon, 




Examples of network pairs having made this transition include Facebook and Zynga (BBC News, 2012), 
Google and Yelp (Smith, 2012), Microsoft and Netscape (Stern, 1997), and Twitter and its third-party 
clients (Newton, 2018). These platforms (Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter) initially attracted 
third-party developers (Zynga, Yelp, Netscape, and Twitter third-party developers) who built apps to 
make use of each platform’s user base. However, once the platforms had grown large enough, these 
third-party developers were no longer complements to the platforms but instead competitors who 
were taking potential profits and users away from the platform. Because the platforms have absolute 
control over user access, they were able to change platform rules without consideration for the 
participants. This results in platforms developing or buying solutions previously offered in-house by 
third-parties and removing the original creators from their networks.  
The third-party transition from cooperation to competition has been described as a ‘bait-and-switch’ 
(Dixon, 2018). As a result, “…over time, the best entrepreneurs, developers, and investors have 
become wary of building on top of centralised platforms” (Dixon, 2018). For network users, the 
transition involves the surrender of privacy and data, with security breaches also becoming a later risk. 
Exploitation by centralised parties is a dysfunctional rent-seeking behaviour that occurs when trust is 
manufactured politically (Tullock, 1967). 
The shift away from placing trust in open internet protocols began in the mid-2000s, when trust 
moved from open protocols to centralised companies. Companies such as Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter have built platforms and services that exceed the functionality of open protocols, migrating 
users to these superior platforms. However, the code of these platforms is proprietary and the power 
structure allows owners to make absolute decisions. Some additional examples of this control power 
include granting or denying user access to platforms (e.g., Google and Yelp, or Facebook and Zynga), 
search result rankings (Google), and revenue generation by network creators (YouTube). Such 
decisions are critical in determining the value that network participants may gain from partaking in 
the platform. 
In contrast, cryptonetworks make use of two mechanisms to remain neutral throughout their growth 
and consequently do not experience the same bait-and-switch tactics as centralised platforms. The 
first mechanism is enforcing and storing the contract between the cryptonetwork and its participants 
in open-source code as trust is decentralised and manufactured cryptographically rather than 
politically (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017; Bamakan, Motavali & Babaei Bondarti, 2020). Secondly, a ‘voice’ 
and ‘exit’ mechanism is applied. Participants are given a voice (power) through the network’s 
governance structure through the implementation of tokens (Oliveira et al., 2018; Katina et al., 2019). 




in extreme scenarios, participants may exit the network through forking.8 The political economy of a 
cryptonetwork may therefore be thought of as private order competitive federalism (Tiebout, 1956), 
as it enables free entry into and exit out of multiple networks, comparable to ‘voting with one’s feet’ 
(Davidson, De Filippi & Potts, 2016). This allows for the removal of rent-seeking behaviour by 
decentralising network rule control. MacDonald (2015) referred to this shift in power as ‘crypto 
secession’. 
 
Chapter 3 has introduced the concept of cryptonetworks, which are created through the combination 
of blockchain technology and tokens. Cryptonetworks look to build upon, disrupt and potentially form 
entirely new business models by blending the functionality of centralised platforms with the 
community-orientated nature of the original open protocols of the internet. Cryptonetworks operate 
under a meritocratic framework in which participants interact through pure economic incentives 
instead of orders. Any orders are enforced without the need of a third party by using the embedded 
logic programmed in the networks’ consensus protocol. By leveraging economic incentives and 
decentralised enforcement, cryptonetworks act as a bridge between the market and the firm. 
Although cryptonetworks are not suitable for all situations, they supply an alternative that pushes out 
the trade-off boundary between transaction costs and incentive maximisation (Figure 3 – pg22). When 
cryptonetworks are considered, the trade-off relationship shifts from a linear graph to a concave curve 
(Figure 4 – pg24) as, like markets, cryptonetworks allow participants to conduct economic activities 
without a central decision-maker via economic incentivisation mechanisms. And like the firm, 
cryptonetworks also reduce transaction costs. Cryptonetworks also enable value creation to be 
correctly assigned to the actual content creators through tokens. A discussion on decentralisation 
showed decentralisation is needed to combat the negative behaviours of centralised networks which 
turn from a positive-sum game to zero-sum game once adoption has reached a critical level (Figure 6 
– pg26). This often comes at the expense of network participants who are left with no option but to 
comply with the new rules. These participants include those that originally contributed to the initial 
value of the network’s growth. In contrast, cryptonetworks of today remain neutral throughout their 
growth and reward participants for their contributions through tokens. Future implementations of 
cryptonetworks, however, could extend this value creation framework even further. An exploratory 
framework for extending how value could be captured and measured is discussed next in Chapter 4.  
 
8 There are two types of forks: hard and soft. A soft fork only requires a majority of the miners to agree on the 
new rules, while a hard fork requires all nodes to upgrade and agree on the new version. Hard forks can result 




4 Cryptoeconomics – opportunities for value creation 
Economic theories used within blockchain-enabled applications such as cryptonetworks are referred 
to as ‘cryptoeconomics’ or ‘tokenomics’ which is used to build token economies (Oliveira et al., 2018; 
Berg, 2019). Evaluation of the growing literature on cryptoeconomics reveals a prevailing theme: the 
underlying economic concepts are curiously conventional and conservative. The application of such 
orthodox and overly-narrow economic frameworks limits the potential of cryptoeconomics and 
cryptographically enabled, distributed economic-social systems that could permit drastically different 
politics and economics in the future (Bryan et al., 2018). This simple system perspective fails to 
consider the wider organisational, policy and social influences of blockchain (Katina et al., 2019).  
The limitations incurred by applying orthodox economics to cryptoeconomics has two implications for 
the role of tokens. First, with regard to money, tokens offer an additional unit of account (Conley, 
2017) as well as a means of exchange (Evans, 2014; Pilkington, 2016). Second, with regard to 
ownership, tokens allow people to take risks collectively rather than individually. In this chapter, we 
first describe the different schools of economics and their implications for cryptoeconomics and then 
discuss the idea of calculating ‘fundamental value’ in the context of cryptonetworks within the 
different framings of economic schools. The objective is to demonstrate that reframing economic 
theories may fundamentally alter the application of cryptoeconomics, and as a consequence, 
empower future token economies into a new economic paradigm of value capture and creation 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016; Berg, 2019; Lee, 2019). 
 
 The role of economics in cryptoeconomics 
Economics as a discipline is both vast and highly contested. Today, the dominant discourse in 
economics is ‘neoclassical’, as described in Jevons's Theory of Political Economy (Jevons, 1888), 
Menger's Principles of Economics (Menger, 1976), and Walras's Elements of Pure Economics (Walras, 
1874). Although economic discourse has evolved since the 18th and 19th centuries, the neoclassical 
economic school remains dominant. The neoclassical school has faced challenges since its beginnings 
from both the right-wing in the form of libertarianism (Hayek) and the left (Keynesianism and 
Marxism). It is thus unsurprising that even economists disagree about what constitutes the discipline 
of economics. Here, we discuss two definitions of economics that have completely different 
implications for an understanding of cryptoeconomics. The first states economics as “the science 
which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses” (Scoon, 1943). This definition alludes to the determination of price and decision-




that is largely addressed in microeconomics (the inner workings of individual markets) rather than in 
macroeconomics (the interaction of all markets as a unit). 
An alternative definition states that “economics is the social science that deals with the production, 
distribution and consumption of goods and services” (Zambelli, 2013). This definition implies a wider 
social context than the first. More specifically, the second definition is not restricted to the idea of 
individual optimisation or the inner workings of the market, and a focus is placed on the collective 
rather than the individual. The second definition therefore implies that the economic system and 
other more social aspects of life are intertwined. In contrast, the first definition highlights the 
determination of price and decision-making processes by assuming individuals are independent 
rational actors (Levin, Milgrom & Rangel, 2004). Contemporary economics includes game-theory 
strategic rationality as well as ‘systematic irrationality’ or behavioural economics (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Through this evolution, economics has become an 
increasingly mathematical and model-based discipline (Bryan et al., 2018). 
Both definitions of economics have implications for the formation of cryptonetworks. When designing 
cryptonetworks, it is vital to simultaneously recognise the evolution of economic activity allocation 
(definition 1) and the power of mathematical modelling (definition 2). The cryptonetwork that has 
come closest to simultaneously recognising both definitions in its inner workings is Ethereum. Buterin 
provided a definition of cryptoeconomics that is consistent with definition 1: “Build systems that have 
certain desired properties; use cryptography to prove properties about messages that happened in the 
past; use economic incentives defined inside the system to encourage desired properties to hold into 
the future” (Buterin, 2017). 
Conversely, one of Ethereum’s lead developers Vlad Zamfir defined cryptoeconomics in a way that 
best fits definition 2: “A formal discipline that studies protocols that govern the production, 
distribution, and consumption of goods and services in a decentralized digital economy. 
Cryptoeconomics is a practical science that focuses on the design and characterization of these 
protocols” (Zamfir, 2015). 
However, in practice, working definitions of cryptoeconomics have largely been closer to the first 
definition. Sometimes referred to as ‘token engineering’, the scope of cryptoeconomics here focuses 
on designing cryptonetworks with incentives applicable to rational actors. The opportunity cost of 
limiting cryptoeconomics to the first definition is ignoring the potential of tokens beyond their use as 
incentives. More specifically, the sole use of cryptoeconomics to lower transactions costs and create 




the disregard of wider social issues of production, distribution, and consumption of goods and 
services. 
 
4.1.1 Current working definitions of cryptoeconomics 
There is limited consistency with regard to the working definitions of cryptoeconomics. Almost all 
sources start by breaking the term down into two parts: cryptography and economics. However, 
analysis of these two components is not always equal and the definition of the cryptography 
component is often far more detailed and precise than that of its counterpart: “Cryptoeconomics 
comes from two words: Cryptography and Economics. People tend to forget the “economics” part of 
this equation and that is the part that gives the blockchain its unique capabilities [...] Like with any 
solid economic system, there should be incentives and rewards for people to get work done, similarly, 
there should be a punishment system for miners who do not act ethically or do not do a good job. We 
will see how the blockchain incorporates all these basic economic fundamentals” (Blockgeeks, 2017), 
and “Cryptoeconomics [...] combines cryptography and economics in order to create huge 
decentralized peer-to-peer network. On the one side, the cryptography is what makes the peer-2-peer 
network secure, and on the other side, the economics is what motivates the people to participate in 
the network, because it gives the blockchain its unique characteristics” (Energy Premier, 2018). 
The limited framing of economics is perhaps a consequence of the paucity of persons highly qualified 
in both cryptography and economics. Szabo9 stated that ‘an economist or programmer who hasn’t 
studied much computer science, including cryptography, but guesses about it, cannot design or build 
a long-term successful cryptocurrency. A computer scientist and programmer who hasn’t studied much 
economics, but applies common sense, can’ (Szabo, 2018). However, although the first part of this 
statement is arguably correct, the latter is not. It is incorrect to believe that one can create anything 
new from common sense, as one is only able to repeat what is already known. Moreover, if the 
economy functioned via common sense, it would more closely resemble a computer and would follow 
power structures perfectly. Economists, however, treat the issue of power (politics), its control 
mechanisms, and its players as crucial concerns that are neither static nor prescribed and are 
otherwise known as the political economy (Smith, 1776; Mill, 1848). 
Formally trained economists who do not have the necessary computer science knowledge are just as 
susceptible to misspecification. The MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab10 defined cryptoeconomics accordingly: 
“the paper focuses on two key costs that are affected by blockchain technology: the cost of verification, 
 
9 Nick Szabo is a computer scientist and cryptographer known for his research in digital contracts and currency. 




and the cost of networking. For markets to thrive, participants need to be able to efficiently verify and 
audit transaction attributes, including the credentials and reputation of the parties involved, the 
characteristics of the goods and services exchanged, future events that have implications for 
contractual arrangements, etc.” (Catalini & Gans, 2016). The cryptoeconomics team at the University 
of Berkeley provided similar perspectives on the scope of cryptoeconomics: “Although Bitcoin’s 
protocol is often explained from a technological point of view, in this series, I will convey the incentives 
existing at every level that allow for its various comprising parties to interact with cohesion and 
security. This study of the incentives that secure blockchain systems is known as cryptoeconomics” 
(Koticha, 2018). The purpose of including these two definitions is not to critique their contributions as 
both papers achieve their outcomes of explaining what the authors view regarding the extent of the 
involvement of economics in cryptoeconomics. Instead, we argue that by limiting the idea of 
cryptoeconomics to such framings, cryptoeconomics will be restricted only to the optimisation of 
individual transaction costs and incentives. Accordingly, these analytical cryptoeconomic frameworks 
do not apply to larger matters of production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services 
(Bryan et al., 2018). 
 
4.1.2 A Hayekian perspective 
A subset of the blockchain community may be content with limiting the definition and function of 
cryptoeconomics to that of the reduction of transactions costs and the provision of individual 
incentives. Indeed, those who view the interaction of individuals and markets as both efficient and 
‘correct’ will be particularly drawn to maintaining the current cryptoeconomics framework. Adopting 
an approach to economics that is aligned with that of Hayek would see cryptoeconomics maintain its 
current scope. Hayek was a strong believer in the ability of markets and prices to transmit information, 
positing that these create spontaneous self-organisation (Hayek, 1945, 2002). He was also an advocate 
for limiting the role of the government solely to the provision of law and order, a restricted menu of 
public goods and monetary policy. In The Denationalization of Money, Hayek argued against 
government intervention and for the use of private, competitively driven currencies in the following 
extracts: “... but I do not think it an exaggeration to say that history is largely a history of inflation, 
and usually of inflations engineered by governments and for the gain of governments…” (Hayek, 
1976:34), and “We indeed begin to see how completely different an economic landscape the free issue 
of competitive currencies would produce when we realise that under such a system what is known 
today as monetary policy would neither be needed nor even possible. The issuing banks, guided solely 
by their striving for gain, would thereby serve the public interest better than any institution has ever 




This Hayekian perspective may exist in the interpretation of cryptoeconomics within cryptonetworks 
by the blockchain community. This perspective is perhaps unsurprising considering the attitude of 
‘decentralisation above all else’ adopted by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (Song, 2018; Barhydt, 
2019; Schneider, 2019). It is understandable then that parts of Hayek’s ideas resonate with the 
blockchain community, particularly those relative to individuals and incentives which align with 
blockchain’s decentralised philosophy. 
However, a closer inspection of Hayek’s workings reveals that not all such ideas align with those of 
the blockchain community. Although Hayek was against the Keynesian proposal for government-
backed money, he did not believe in the free issuance of money. Instead, Hayek thought that the 
quantity and value of money issued should be determined by growth in the ‘real economy’. For 
example, during the post-WWII global monetary system debates, Hayek proposed a system that would 
be supported by a reserve of basic commodities (e.g. wood, coal, and wheat): “the basic idea is that 
currency should be issued solely in exchange against a fixed combination of warehouse warrants for a 
number of storable raw commodities, and be redeemable in the same ‘commodity unit” (Hayek, 
1943:179). This idea of linking the real economy with money is largely ignored by cryptocurrency 
advocates who often push for non-state currencies without material support. 
Neoclassical economics provides an alternative approach based on optimisation, transaction costs, 
and incentives, while also recognising that markets are limited in their scope. More specifically, 
neoclassical economics argues that there are two broad situations in which markets are limited: 
1. Imperfect markets: situations where firms can achieve return over and above the norm. 
Historically, this term has been used to describe the inefficiencies of oligopolies and 
monopolies. More recently, the term ‘imperfect markets’ also implies the issue of 
asymmetrical information, a situation in which one of the transacting parties has more 
complete information about the transaction than the other party.  
2. Market failure: a result of the market’s inability to effectively allocate prices, as external 
benefits and costs (externalities) are not borne by individual producers. Neoclassical 
economists believe that government intervention is required to overcome these market 
failures. 
Finally, economics is arguably ‘performative’, in that economic models make the world, but they do 
not describe it (Mackenzie, 2006) with economics working under ‘ought’ rather than ‘are’ statements. 
Recognising this perspective is imperative for the full realisation of the potential of cryptoeconomics. 
More precisely, under a ‘radical’ framing (i.e., beyond the strict constraints of orthodox economic 




economies. Similarly, recognising the complexity of social and economic dynamics in token design is 
essential, as it must consider the social and formal technical underpinning of cryptoeconomics as 
equal. However, if token design remains limited to ‘ought’ systems, its social aspects will be 
understated and undervalued, likely leading to failures in the system’s governance structures (Bryan 
et al., 2018).  
In the following section, we discuss the realisation of the full potential of cryptoeconomics. First, we 
argue that tokens should be treated as a means of exchange (transaction perspective) (Evans, 2014; 
Pilkington, 2016) as well as a new unit of account (production and distribution perspective) (Conley, 
2017). 
 
4.1.3 Tokens: a dual-use case argument 
According to the first definition of economics, which highlights optimisation, incentives, and 
transaction costs, tokens are conceived strictly as a means of exchange (Evans, 2014; Pilkington, 2016). 
However, under the perspective of the second definition, the significance of tokens shifts beyond their 
use as a means of exchange to represent a new unit of account (Conley, 2017). The second definition 
suggests that tokens provide a new unit and mechanism for measuring economy size. More 
specifically, the first definition is only concerned with items of the economy that can be measured 
using market calculus. However, the second definition encompasses the measurement of ‘production’ 
and ‘consumption’, a far less precise question with no absolute answer. 
The limitations of the first definition’s measurement criteria are well established. The exclusion of 
economic activities that result in products that are not marketed and therefore have no market price, 
such as household production, the informal sector, and subsistence production, is a well-known 
limitation of the traditional gross domestic product (GDP) function (Ironmonger, 2000). This exclusion 
is a result of the complexity of specifying a market price for items such as household production, or 
that of correctly pricing externalities such as pollution. Early responses to these limitations included 
measurement concepts such as ‘triple-bottom-line reporting’ (Slaper & Hall, 2011) and ‘ethical 
investing’ (Hudson, 2005). However, these measurement criteria suffer from the same limitations: 
they are solely profit-centric. Tokens open the opportunity to re-evaluate this measurement issue. As 
a means of exchange, tokens facilitate new ways of trading (Evans, 2014; Pilkington, 2016). As a unit 





The first challenge in discovering new ways of trading and measurement via cryptoeconomics is 
opening a dialogue regarding the definition of ‘production’ and ‘consumption’. These discussions 
include determining how to incorporate the production of previously excluded items such as social, 
political, aesthetic, organisational, and environmental interactions. Crucially, new measurement 
criteria should be socially useful and indeed socially validated measures. The first implication is that 
production value cannot be reduced to the single measure of monetary price, which should instead 
be treated as one of many measurement indexes. Other indexes will need to be developed following 
the social quantification of other goods, services, and intangibles.  
In cryptoeconomics, the question of what to measure and how is a critical question. Mainstream 
economics and accounting recognise the extreme difficulty of measuring intangible assets (Corrado, 
Hulten & Sichel, 2009; Jeny, 2015). Although it is relatively easy to measure the value of assets such 
as equipment and land, measuring that of intangible assets such as intellectual property (IP) and 
brands is far more complex. The history of financial economics provides some insight into the 
difficulties surrounding the measurement of intangible assets. 
In financial economics, every company has a ‘fundamental value’. Also known as the company’s 
‘intrinsic value’, it is the perceived value of a company and includes both tangible and intangible 
assets, using fundamental analysis (Mohanram, Saiy & Vyas, 2018). Unlike more traditional valuation 
techniques, fundamental value posits that a company can be valued outside of what the market price 
states and therefore also has an intrinsic value. This concept is most often applied by value investors 
who look beyond pure market-based measurement techniques (Gottwald, 2012; Amiri, 
Ravanpaknodezh & Jelodari, 2016). The resulting ‘fundamental’ value of a company may or may not 
be equal to its market value. Fundamental value analysis was especially popular in the 1980s during 
private equity buyouts, which were based on the idea that a company was worth more when broken 
up into ‘parts’ and sold as a going concern (Acharya, Franks & Servaes, 2007; Blundell-Wignall, 2007). 
Since the 1980s, measuring the value of a company has become an increasingly challenging task after 
changes in capital accumulation and the rise of ‘intangible capital’ (Montes, 2010). 
Intangible capital refers to investments resulting in the growth of a company that leverages intangible 
assets (Montes, 2010). Intangible capital is not new, but its use remained relatively limited pre-1990s 
and it was simply categorised as ‘goodwill’. Today however, the intangible capital of the largest 
companies cannot be ignored as it makes up the majority of their value. For example, 62%, 88%, and 
95% of the enterprise value of Apple, Microsoft, and Amazon is made up of intangible assets, 
respectively (Brand Finance Institute, 2017). Such a radical increase in the importance of intangible 




Measurement techniques from the 1980s are still applied, resulting in a measurement crisis (Montes, 
2010; Bryan et al., 2018). The major assets of today’s biggest companies no longer include those that 
have expiry dates and replacement costs, such as machinery, but are instead intangibles such as IP, 
information, brand, and reputation that do not have predefined expiry dates or replacement costs, 
and are often unique with no direct substitutes, thus making valuation extremely difficult.  
Intangible capital on company balance sheets are currently priced as call options (the sale of intangible 
assets to shareholders at a projected future of the intangible value). Call options are a type of 
derivative whose price reflects the exposure risk on the value of intangible capital (Bryan & Rafferty, 
2006; Rafferty & Bryan, 2008). The issue of the measurement of intrinsic value is circumvented using 
this accounting technique. The conventional accounting framework needs updating and this was 
attempted by Baruch Lev, a New York University accounting professor and leading accounting expert 
on intangible assets, and Feng Gu, a prominent US-based accountant. According to Lev and Gu, the 
use of accounting information such as net income and return on equity in explaining stock prices is no 
longer appropriate (Lev & Gu, 2016). This is associated with poor accounting standards for IP and in 
particular the measurement of research and development (Lev & Gu, 2016). This is unsurprising 
considering that the current framework was designed during a period of manufacturing that provided 
clear definitions of machinery, labour, and ownership and during which social impacts were strictly 
understood as profit, interest, rent, and wages. 
Similar to that in the largest companies of today, the majority of assets in cryptoeconomics are also 
intangible, and the issue of measuring intangible assets is one that cryptonetworks share with 
conventional firms that comprise considerable IP. However, unlike conventional markets, valuation 
techniques for crypto markets are still being tested and defined and may well move beyond 
conventional accounting categories. Token valuation techniques must be developed in a way that 
specifically addresses the contributions of intangible capital to correctly measure and incorporate 
other contributions to societal growth. Considering that gamification is built into cryptonetworks via 
economic incentives using tokens, the most significant challenges faced in the development of crypto 
valuation frameworks are measuring required indexes and preventing participants from abusing the 
system’s gamification mechanisms. Although it is not within the purpose of this paper, early attempts 
at crypto token valuation have shown to be exploratory and have their limitations. It would therefore 
appear that just like mainstream accounting, cryptoaccounting does not yet possess the necessary 





 Information, knowledge, and tokens 
Price, as we know it today, is the condensation of multiple determinations. The market processes all 
types of information and creates knowledge, resulting in spontaneous order: “The most significant 
fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual 
participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind 
of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on, and passed on only to those concerned. It 
is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or 
a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of 
a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities 
to changes of which they never know more than is reflected in the price movement” (Hayek, 1945:526-
527). 
In the 1940s, the argument for ‘the market’ stood as a strong alternative to central planning. Nearly 
80 years have passed since then and this argument is no longer relevant. Today, to learn about 
individual decisions, we have access to ‘big data’ and already have the computational power to 
process these data almost instantly. Thus, the desire and indeed the need to simplify and reduce 
complex variables (such as individual decisions) to a single ‘price’ no longer exists. Decentralised 
decision-making in cryptonetworks does not require formulating decisions solely through market 
prices (discussed in Chapter 3). Thus, the powerful potential of cryptonetworks is to challenge the 
very idea of the Hayekian price as the desired outcome of markets (Bryan et al., 2018).  
In The Use of Knowledge in Society, Hayek argued that price encapsulates a complex set of 
information, creating knowledge for society, and that price enables a simple representation of that 
complexity (Hayek, 1945). Blockchain and more specifically tokens introduce fundamentally new ways 
of handling such complex information and measure value. To update this argument for a 21st-century 
context, it is helpful to reframe Hayek’s argument in relation to risk and derivatives. Two aspects 
should be highlighted: 
• Through the use of big data and blockchain, the information that makes up ‘knowledge’ as 
we know it today can be ‘divided’ into core elements that Hayek believed were too 
complicated to separate. Therefore, knowledge can be viewed as an artificial asset or a 
product of informational data points.  
• Price itself is a derivative of the underlying elements of information it is said to combine. In 




actually the strike price11 on the option of the artificial asset known as knowledge (Hayek, 
1945; Bryan et al., 2018).  
Therefore, if ‘price’ as viewed by Hayek is the condensation of multiple elements of information, what 
are these key elements for which price represents the risk (exposure) of a derivative? Once these 
elements are defined, the next questions would be: how important is each element beyond 
underpinning price? Can any of the elements be used in their own context as knowledge or as 
indicators for the market? For clarity, it is important to understand the implication of Keynesian and 
Hayekian discourses. With regard to Hayek, if the information making up price can be disentangled, 
the goal of using this information is challenged to consider other measures outside that of a single 
price. This discussion reveals entirely new social measurements with an economy. However, for 
Keynes, markets will not tend towards the stability of full employment and thus it is up to nation states 
to govern the national economy. Paramount to this is the idea that the state must tightly control and 
define its own financial system (Keynes, 1936). In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Keynes argues that the economic characteristics of money are not what makes it unique: “the 
money-rate of interest — we may remind the reader — is nothing more than the percentage excess of 
a sum of money contracted for forward delivery, e.g. a year hence, over what we may call the “spot” 
or cash price of the sum thus contracted for forward delivery […] Thus for every durable commodity 
we have a rate of interest in terms of itself, — a wheat-rate of interest, a copper-rate of interest, a 
house-rate of interest, even a steel-plant-rate of interest […] Money is the greatest of the own-rates 
of interest (as we may call them) which rules the roost” (Keynes, 1936:141).  
Keynes describes money as the ‘greatest of the own-rates of interest’ for four reasons: (1) money 
itself does not produce any use value (such as copper or wheat) and so it remains exclusively as 
‘money’, (2) the issuance of money has no wastage, (3) it is the most liquid of assets, and (4) its 
quantity is controlled. There are two points to note with regard to Keynes’ observations on money. 
First, the four reasons proposed by Keynes to form the ‘greatness’ of state-operated money are not 
as convincing today, as all financial derivatives are as liquid and fungible as state money, and tokens 
are not confined to any one nation. Second, the language used by Keynes is now applied to financial 
derivatives in relation to the rate of interest: interest is the derivative of money. For the author, money 
is unquestionably state money. In this context, tokens are then an option on state money, 
representing the right to ‘sell out’ (de-risk) from the state’s unit of account (Bryan et al., 2018). 
 
11 ‘A strike price is the price at which a derivative contract can be bought or sold (exercised)’ (Calin, Chang & 




Therefore, if money is a derivative of risk to the state, what are tokens a derivative of? And what 
alternative economic and social organisation structures exist? 
To expand on these two divergences on contemporary economic thought, price must be redefined. 
Price is no more than an index that measures relative values between products and over time (Fetter, 
1912). Today though, price is treated by society as the absolute social measure of value. This social 
measure is the central idea behind the trust placed in a fiat monetary system. However, history has 
shown that this absolute measure is a social construct and that it can be changed, for example during 
the switch from the French Franc to the Euro in 2002 (European Commission, 2019) or the change in 
the British pound decimal system (Freeman, 2011). The very idea of tokens or cryptocurrencies is in 
stark contrast to the use of one absolute social measure (price). Therefore, why is price is treated as 
the only benchmark index for value? Why not use a social or environmental impact index instead? It 
is argued that price is reflective of the social and cultural values of a capitalist society (Bryan et al., 
2018) and that by treating price as a sole valuation benchmark, two assumptions are made: (1) 
producing for the market is more valuable than producing for direct consumption as consumption 
generates no price (e.g., farming one’s own food), and (2) profit is embedded within price. These 
assumptions make sense within a capitalist society as they capture what is valued by such societies. 
The use of GDP as the only valuation measure has been criticised as it does not reflect the costs 
imposed on the environment of production and consumption and excludes any consideration of 
environmental costs (Nordhaus & Kokkelenberg, 1999; Muller, Mendelsohn & Nordhaus, 2011; 
Muller, 2014; Chowdhury & Islam, 2017). Furthermore, GDP is not reflective of actual measures that 
reflect life satisfaction (Oswald, 1997; Abdallah, Thompson & Marks, 2008; Cassandra, 2010; Berkeley 
Economic Review, 2018). However, a discussion of the correct indexes for use is outside the scope of 
this paper. Rather, we highlight that any potential alternative index to GDP should provide a 
measurable underpinning of the social organisations of today. 
 
 Reframing value through cryptonetworks 
Today, in the context of business models, value creation can be described as the “the processes and 
activities, resources and capabilities, and their orchestration in the firm” (Weking et al., 2020). Value 
creation is the product of a firm’s revenue and cost structure which ultimately determines how a firm 
makes money (Frankenberger, Weiblen & Gassmann, 2014; Gassmann, Frankenberger & Sauer, 2017). 
Chapter 3 has already discussed how cryptonetworks can alter the cost structure of firms as well as 
correctly reward value creation to the actual content producers through tokens (Lee, 2019). In that 




below, however, is an exploratory framework on how value creation within cryptonetworks could be 
reconfigured to usher in a new economic paradigm on what value creation is (Tapscott & Tapscott, 
2016; Lee, 2019). And in doing so, capture the wider social value of production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods and services. 
In an economy that does not consider profit as its sole objective, entirely new measurement methods 
will need to be developed, as even combining GDP frameworks with qualifiers (e.g., pricing 
environmental impact) would still fall under a profit-centric framing. Therefore, adding qualifiers will 
only result in the need to justify the lack of profit in the name of unmeasurable social improvements. 
Under a framework that treats profit as the key measure of value, any non-profit-generating indexes 
are viewed as ‘trade-offs’. The objective should be to frame these not as trade-offs but as another 
means of conducting economic activity. However, achieving this would require abandoning profit as 
the singular goal, a difficult undertaking. 
Adapting a view from Hayek provides a starting point for the formulation of these updated valuation 
measurement techniques, with the use of tokens as the unit of account (Conley, 2017). Hayekian price 
may be referred to as the ‘profit price’ reflecting a profit-centric perspective on value. 
Cryptoeconomics, however, provides new tools to measure both present and future value forms, 
allowing the incorporation of intangible forms of value. As discussed earlier, ‘profit price’ is not 
equipped to accurately measure future (intangible) value, calling for the development of new 
measurement techniques. Using knowledge as an example, determining how, where, and when ‘profit 
price’ gains its value highlights its limitations as a value-capturing index. Knowledge is a key 
component of a firm in creating a sustainable competitive advantage (Jana, 2016). The value obtained 
from knowledge accrues in three ways: (1) when it is adopted, repeated, shared, or copied in multiple 
ways, reflecting the inherent collective and social nature of knowledge, (2) when it interpreted, 
accepted, and thus invested in, and (3) when the creators of knowledge share in its gains and risk and 
continuously update it. These three key features of knowledge encompass precisely what Hayekian 
‘profit price’ value is unable to accurately reflect. Capturing value in line with these three points 
requires an entirely new grammar. In this new grammar, value accrues through: (1) adopting, 
repeating and sharing multiple use cases (as opposed to the restriction of proprietary ownership, such 
as IP rights), (2) having multiple owners, interpretations, and versions (as opposed to keeping the 
source code private, e.g., the Microsoft Windows operating system vs the open-source Linux operating 
system), and (3) collective self-regulation, governance, and organisation (as opposed to singular 




A more suitable index could be a ‘social’ index/price that would capture the new forms of value listed 
here. Under a Hayekian framework, calculating a social index is almost impossible, requiring a 
monumental cultural shift in social as well as economic norms. The shift would mean economic 
production for value and not profit. However, producing for value is arguably no less logical than 
producing for profit and this is where tokens offer a unique value proposition. Tokens allow for 
experimentation in developing a social index of price by testing multiple valuation indexes that express 
different social priorities, in the same way that profit price expresses the priorities of capitalism. 
Calculating ‘fundamental value’ in the context of cryptoeconomics is paramount as it is the first 
indication of good governance (Katina et al., 2019). Fundamental value provides the framework to 
determine whether an issued token fulfils its posited production. Thus, there must be an unmistakable 
relationship between token issuance and production output. Past views of fundamental value are not 
applicable in their unaltered states as the traditional perception of fundamental value refers to some 
‘intrinsic’ or ‘underlying’ value existing outside of the market. Smith referred to this as a ‘natural 
price’ (Smith, 1776), while Marx viewed fundamental value as ‘socially necessary labour time’ (Marx, 
1875). The accountancy profession believes in the fundamental, long-term productive value of 
corporate assets (Gottwald, 2012). Intangible capital falls outside the scope of each of these examples 
of fundamental value measurement, thus leading to problems as the prevalence of intangible capital 
is rising rapidly.  
In conclusion, a shift in measurement methods is needed as the nature of capital is evolving from the 
tangible to the intangible. Over the last six decades, financial markets have displayed similar shifts in 
the way value is measured as the nature of capital has changed. Fundamental value techniques have 
shifted away from stock measures (labour hours, machinery, and physical factories) to flow measures, 
or as measures existing at a point of time outside the market (stock) towards new ways of measuring 
activities over time within markets (flow). This flow approach to fundamental value echoes the 
interoperable nature of transactions on a blockchain, signifying the need for a new fundamental value 





5 Case study: MakerDAO 
So far, we have defined blockchain, its use cases, limitations, and potential (Chapter 2), and discussed 
cryptonetworks as one of the implementations of blockchain technology (Chapter 3). We proposed 
that cryptonetworks provide a balance between the market and firm, thus reducing transaction costs 
while maximising incentives for individuals. The purpose of the current chapter is to use MakerDAO 
as a case study to supply a practical illustration of cryptonetwork. MakerDAO was chosen as it directly 
relates to the reduction of transaction costs and the benefits of decentralised platforms. The Maker 
platform also incorporates other intriguing economic mechanisms to align incentives between 
network participants and maintain the stability of the network token DAI. Lastly, MakerDAO is a 
stablecoin blockchain which has been seeing an increasing amount of interest as they look to address 
the price volatilities of cryptocurrencies (Xu & Zou, 2020). Global stable coins have the potential to 
promote financial inclusion and improve cross-border payments as well as the international monetary 
system (Xu & Zou, 2020).  
 
 The MakerDAO platform  
MakerDAO is a cryptonetwork that provides access to decentralised collateralised financial 
instruments12 that are linked to the USD. The Maker network incentivises collective behaviour and 
participation in the network and reflects both the current and future price of its network token. 
MakerDAO is made up of two components: Maker, a decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO), 
and DAI, a stablecoin managed by Maker. A DAO may be defined as ‘the most complex form of a smart 
contract, where the bylaws of the decentralized organization are embedded into the code of the smart 
contract, using complex token governance rules’ (Hsieh et al., 2018; BlockchainHub, 2019). Stablecoins 
are new cryptocurrencies whose value is pegged to another asset, which may be a fiat currency such 
as the USD, another cryptocurrency, precious metals, or some combination of all three (Senner & 
Sornette, 2019). In addition, Maker manages the MKR token, which is used for governance over the 
network (Maker, 2017).  
The Maker platform allows ETH holders to collateralise their ETH in return for DAI-denoted loans 
through a system known as collateralised debt positions (CDPs). DAI is a decentralised USD-soft 
pegged13 stablecoin (1 DAI~$1). CDPs are smart contracts that lock ETH as collateral which is only 
returned when the DAI is repaid. When ETH is locked up in a CDP, it becomes ‘wrapped ETH’ (WETH) 
 
12 ‘a contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of 
another entity’ (IAS, 2019) 




and is tradeable. All WETH is then consolidated into Maker’s pooled ETH (PETH), which contains all 
collateralised ETH within the Maker system (Maker, 2017). DAI loan owners may use their loans in 
numerous ways, including for hedging, crypto trading, and transfers. However, the Maker system 
specifies that a CDP must maintain a minimum 150% collateralisation ratio or risk liquidation. This is 
to protect the CDP from any sharp price movements in ETH. Currently, Maker only supports ETH as 
collateral although there are plans to extend this to a multi-collateral system with other 
cryptocurrencies (Maker, 2017; MakerDAO, 2018a, 2019a).  
 
5.1.1 CDP mechanisms 
CDPs are the source of any DAI that is loaned out by the Maker system (BitPR, 2019). Users may decide 
on the amount of ETH to lock up in a CDP in return for DAI. When a user decides to close out their 
loan, a stability fee must be paid in MKR along with the owed DAI. This stability fee has recently 
increased to lower the total supply of DAI and return its value to $1, and is currently 19.5% (Kim, 
2019a). DAI has struggled to maintain its soft peg since February 2019 with the market price falling as 
low as $0.95, and a supply decrease was required. To the relief of the Maker platform, recent DAI price 
trends suggest that the fee increase is working (Kim, 2019b). Although 19.5% is high, it is expected to 
be a temporary measure only until DAI price stabilises adequately (BitPR, 2019). 
MKR tokens are paid to close out a loan and stability fees are burned (destroyed) to reduce the MKR 
supply in the hope of increasing the value of remaining MKR tokens, ceteris paribus. DAI’s stability is 
underpinned by the notion of over-collateralisation, implying that the total amount of ETH collateral 
locked up must be at least 150% of the DAI borrowed (i.e., to loan out $100 DAI, $150 ETH must be 
locked up as collateral). This collateral will remain locked up in the CDP until the loan is paid back in 
full, including the outstanding DAI and stability fees. 
 
 The MKR token 
MKR is the Maker ecosystem’s native ERC-20 token14 and is its governance and profit-accumulating 
token, which is also burned to cover stability fees. MKR tokens represent the holder’s governance 
rights and holders may use MKR to vote for changes to the functioning of the Maker platform (e.g., an 
increase in stability fees). Any modifications to the internal governance variables of the Maker 
platform are suggested through active proposals. Active proposals are smart contracts for which MKR 
 
14 An ERC-20 token is the technical standard token on Ethereum used for all smart contracts on the Ethereum 




token-holders may vote through community voting and are designed to self-execute approved 
modifications to the Maker platform. Other examples of parameters that can be altered through active 
proposals are liquidation ratios, penalty ratios, debt ceiling (maximum amount of debt allowed in a 
single CDP), and stability fees (i.e., interest on PETH). MKR holders must also vote to choose which 
Oracles the Maker platform should trust to supply the data feeds for DAI. MakerDAO defines Oracles 
as: ‘Ethereum accounts (either contracts or users) selected to provide price feeds into various 
components of Maker Platform’ (Maker, 2017). Oracles are essential as they provide the real-time 
information used by Maker to determine the market price of DAI and to trigger liquidations of CDPs.  
In addition, MKR acts as a backup in the case of DAI insolvency, which would most likely be caused by 
a black swan event such as a substantial and unanticipated drop in ETH price. In this situation, MKR 
tokens could be sold to cover unpaid DAI loans and prevent the DAI price (value) from crashing. 
MakerDAO also creates and sells new MKR tokens on the open market to support DAI by recapitalising 
when needed. Such actions incentivise good governance from MKR token-holders as they would 
otherwise be called upon to protect DAI from insolvency.  
 
5.2.1 Use cases of DAI 
DAI loans differ from traditional bank loans as they do not require a middleman, thus making such 
loans accessible to more people and allowing lower transaction fees for borrowers (BitPR, 2019). 
Furthermore, as DAI is a stablecoin, price volatility is reduced. A few use cases for DAI are discussed 
here. 
Leverage and hedging 
As ETH is the only accepted collateral, DAI is particularly useful for ETH holders. For instance, if an ETH 
holder wished to increase their ETH exposure but did not want to use USD or another fiat currency, 
the user could open a CDP, collateralise their ETH, receive DAI as a loan in return, and use the DAI to 
buy more ETH. This is referred to as decentralised leverage (BitPR, 2019). Importantly though, users 
are not restricted to using DAI to only buy ETH but may also buy other cryptocurrencies. In addition, 
DAI can be used by users to hedge their crypto position during times of market volatility when ETH 
holders may want to temporarily move out their ETH holdings without selling them. 
 
Making payments or savings 
DAI may also be used by users wanting to pay one another in cryptocurrency but who are afraid of the 




adding a DAI savings rate (DSR), through which DAI holders will be paid interest provided they lock up 
their DAI in a DSR smart contract (MakerDAO, 2018b). Maker plans to launch DSR alongside multi-
collateral DAI (BitPR, 2019).  
Decentralised apps (DApps) have built upon Maker to enable payment and saving functionalities, 
including InstaDApp15 and Bloqboard.16 InstaDApp is a decentralised bank that aims to simplify 
banking activities such as making transactions and applying or paying back loans. Currently, InstaDApp 
has 8 291 ETH locked up as collateral (approximately $2 million). Bloqboard uses smart contracts to 
enable peer-to-peer borrowing and lending, and an estimated $150 000 in loans has already been 
processed through this platform.  
 
International transfers 
Users may also use DAI as a global store of value and medium of exchange. DAI may be transferred 
without the concern of price volatility present with most cryptocurrencies as it is a stablecoin pegged 
to the USD and is therefore insulated from crypto market fluctuations. This feature is particularly 
useful in countries that have high inflation rates, such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Argentina (Renner & 
Doya, 2018; Johnson, 2019; Reuters, 2019). Residents in such countries may use DAI to protect their 
savings and move funds freely around the world. 
5.2.2 Buying DAI 
The official way of obtaining DAI is by opening a CDP (Figure 7 below) as follows: 
1. The user must decide how much ETH is to be used as collateral.  
2. A CDP is opened and ETH from the user’s wallet is locked up. 
3. In return, DAI is generated.  
4. DAI can then be used by the users in any way (e.g., to trade or lend). 
5. Once a user decides to pay back their loan, the original DAI amount is paid back along with 
the stability fees denoted by MKR tokens (MKR tokens are accessible through several crypto 
exchanges including Coinbase and Cex.io). 
6. The CDP is closed and the MKR tokens used as the stability fee payment are burned 
(destroyed).  
7. Finally, the user’s original ETH collateral amount is returned to their wallet. 
 
15 See: https://instadapp.io 














Figure 7: DAI buying process (source: DiPrisco, 2017) 
 
Users that wish to open a CDP can do so directly through the Maker website, which guides users 
through the process and offers management tools including repayment and loan liquidation terms. 
Alternatively, DAI can also be acquired through direct transfers (receiving DAI as payment from 
someone directly to your wallet) or exchanges (either via centralised or decentralised exchanges such 
as Coinbase or OasisDEX). 
 
 The risks of DAI 
5.3.1 Loan risks 
As is the case with any loan, being under-collateralised or unable to reimburse the loan places the 
original capital at risk. In the case of DAI, a collateralisation ratio of 150% is needed as a minimum. If 
this ratio decreases below 150%, the CDP will be liquidated by MakerDAO and the loan owners will 
lose their collateral. However, liquidation resulting from under-collateralisation is the worst-case 
scenario and can be prevented. The collateralisation ratio may fall below 150% as a result of 
movements in the ETH price (BitPR, 2019) and, as shown in Figure 8 below, a recent drop in the price 
of ETH (orange line) caused the price of DAI (green line) to rise above $1. This is because DAI holders 















Figure 8: Prices of DAI and ETH (source: CoinMarketCap, 2019) 
5.3.2 USD peg risks 
The prices of DAI and its USD peg over the month of April to May 2019 are shown in Figure 9. As seen 
in Figure 8, DAI has previously traded both below and above its $1 peg. At the time of writing, DAI was 
trading at $0.99 (CoinMarketCap, 2019). A break from its peg represents a risk to DAI holders and the 














 Key statistics for MakerDAO 
Below are some key figures of the Maker platform to illustrate its current state (data retrieved 25 May 
2019).  
Market position: 
• Maker makes up approximately 90% of all USD locked up in decentralised finance projects 
(Shaughnessy, Demarco & Lulla, 2019). 
• Approximately 1.7 million ETH is held in CDPs, making up 1.6% of all ETH supply (McDonald, 
2019). 
User growth rates: 
• The Maker platform has experienced an average active user growth rate of 20% per month 
(MakerDAO, 2019b), indicating a growing demand for DAI.  
Trading statistics: 
• MKR is trading at $679.79 with a market cap of $679 793 190 (CoinMarketCap, 2019) 
• There are 12 179 unique addresses that hold MKR tokens (Etherscan, 2019) 
• The system collateralisation ratio is currently at 539.10% and is considered safe (McDonald, 
2019) 
• The total DAI supply is 82 349 535 with 24 196 DAI token-holders (McDonald, 2019) 
 
 Challenges faced by the Maker platform 
Here, we discuss the two most significant challenges faced by the Maker platform. As this platform 
was only launched at the end of 2017, many of these challenges may be overcome as the platform 
matures.  
 
5.5.1 Scalability and stability  
DAI has set a debt ceiling of $100 million and at the time of writing, 82 million DAI had been issued, 
thus representing 80% of the ceiling. Maker has intentionally set this limit on DAI’s debt to ensure 
that the system grows at a healthy rate while still ‘proving’ itself in the market (BitPR, 2019), for 
example by demonstrating price stability at its $1 peg or having the capacity to absorb any 
cryptocurrency market shocks, although neither has yet been proved. By restricting its debt ceiling, 




comparing with the market cap for all major stablecoins, which is currently $3.892 billion (Messari, 
2019). DAI is thus the fifth largest stablecoin, encompassing approximately 2% of the total stablecoin 
market (Messari, 2019). Over-collateralisation also presents a concern to DAI’s scalability as not every 
ETH holder will have enough ETH to over-collateralise and meet the requirements of opening CDPs of 
any meaningful size. Maker will continue to trade-off between scalability and stability, thus putting a 
cap on the value users may derive from the platform, at least until the Maker system can handle the 
added pressures of a higher debt ceiling.  
 
5.5.2 Low trading volume 
Considering MKR’s role within the Maker platform, it is concerning that the 24-h trading volume may 
fluctuate from $588 000 to $9 303 000 on any day. These fluctuations are significant and even at $9 
million, the trading volume is significantly lower than the MKR total market cap of $679 million. 
Therefore, such low trading volumes could potentially create liquidity and systematic risks for MKR 
token-holders (BitPR, 2019). Moreover, the liquidity risk for MKR holders may be exacerbated by a 
crypto bear market. 
 
 The potential of MakerDAO 
Unlike other major stablecoin platforms, MakerDAO’s governance is exclusively maintained by MKR 
token-holders. The Maker platform therefore presents an intriguing model for truly decentralised 
financing. MakerDAO aims to bring independence and financial freedom to its users, remove reliance 
upon intermediaries in the financial system, and become a testbed for financial democratisation. The 
increasing digitalisation of financial activities coupled with a growing interest in blockchain technology 
promises an attractive future for Maker. Future features such as multi-collateralisation and saving 
rates will only add to Maker’s value and potential use cases. Investors have taken note of this, with 
the well-known American venture capital fund Andreessen Horowitz investing $15 million into Maker 
in September 2018, providing Maker with enough capital to cover operating costs for the next three 
years (BitPR, 2019). 
 
 MakerDAO – lowering costs, creating value 
It is now of interest to explicitly link the discussions from Chapters 2 and 3 with the case study on 
MakerDAO. As per Coase’s original theorem, there are three types of transaction costs that originate 




and policing and enforcement costs (Coase, 1937). In Chapter 3, we discussed how cryptonetworks 
reduce such transaction costs. Here, specific reference to the cryptonetwork MakerDAO will be made 
to illustrate the reduction of these transaction costs. 
 
5.7.1 Transaction costs 
The provision of financial loans is not new. Financial loans can be sourced from the market or firms. 
Therefore, to understand the way MakerDAO as a cryptonetwork fits into the discussion surrounding 
transaction costs, one first needs to define the market and the firm as alternative sources of loans. In 
the case of financing, the firm could be any bank (Nowiński & Kozma, 2017). The market, on the other 
hand, could be an individual with excess capital to loan out.  
Today, to take out a loan at market interest rates or make a secured financial transfer, one almost 
always has to use the services of a bank (Capitec, 2019; Nedbank, 2019; Standard Bank, 2019). 
However, the use of banking services come at the cost of high transfer fees and interest rates, lengthy 
transfer times, and stringent application requirements (Caskey, 2002; Samuels, 2003; Ratha & 
Riedberg, 2005; Johnston & Morduch, 2008; Love, 2009; McKane, 2019). Therefore, banks essentially 
decide who has access to financing, leaving many people in developing countries unbanked and 
excluding them from 21st-century finance tools (World Bank Group, 2017). As such individuals do not 
have access to bank services, they are forced to find alternative solutions and may seek loans from 
informal sources such as loan sharks or family and friends. However, searching for loans from the 
market comes with the transaction costs defined by Coase. With regard to secured international 
transfers, a bank account is a prerequisite as is often the use of a SWIFT payment network17 (McKinsey, 
2018; World Economic Forum, 2018), although it is worth noting that e-wallets are beginning to show 
promise, albeit in a fragmented and underdeveloped market (Hughes & Lonie, 2007; Dennehy & 
Sammon, 2015). Similarly, transacting online or making secure international digital payments without 
a bank is extremely difficult (McKinsey & Company, 2018; World Economic Forum, 2018). According 
to Coase, searching for alternative solutions within the market is rendered unfeasible, or at the very 
least expensive in terms of money and time, because of the high transaction costs incurred (Coase, 
1937). Even if a source is found, negotiating an attractive rate to borrow or transfer funds is costly and 
enforcing this deal without an overruling entity such as a bank is likely to be difficult.  
The Maker platform seeks to solve these problems of availability and expense and thereby begin to 
bridge financial exclusion gaps in the following ways: 
 




• Search and information costs 
Access to the MakerDAO platform and acquisition of DAI or MKR are neither prohibitive nor selective. 
Anyone who wishes to open a CDP can do so. Maker does not require a credit check, only that you 
have the ETH needed to collateralise any relevant CDPs. Users are then free to make international 
transfers or payments, instantly and while incurring a minimal fee. In other words, Maker improves 
decision-making power by significantly improving information asymmetry and giving all users equal 
access to the available information regarding price using its network Oracles. Moreover, users know 
that they can trust the accuracy of the transaction information because of the transparent and 
immutable nature of blockchain.  
• Bargaining and decision costs 
Because of Maker’s decentralised nature, users do not need to negotiate rates when opening CDPs. 
Instead, users will pay the market rate of whatever the price of DAI is at the time and have access to 
instant liquidity that is ordinarily only offered by banks while also knowing that they are getting the 
best possible rate by the market. By definition, transacting in an open market means that users will 
only transact when their WTP and WTA are equal.  
• Policing and enforcement costs 
Maker uses smart contracts built upon blockchain, and consensus protocols are used to ensure 
enforcement of any loans, transfers, or payments made on the platform. There is no single entity that 
can choose to increase interest rates or liquidate loans. These rules are hardcoded and self-executed 
by the Maker platform, not individuals, meaning that there are no legal contracts are needed, thus 
reducing costs associated with both drawing up and enforcing such contracts. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two other factors that can further impact transaction costs, 
according to Williamson:  
• Bounded rationality 
Transacting on any cryptonetwork, including Maker, does not alter the cognitive limitations of 
individuals. It does however improve decision-making power by significantly reducing information 
asymmetry as all users on Maker have equal access to the available information via network Oracles, 
which are appointed by the majority of MKR token-holders and not by a single entity looking for self-
benefit. Finally, because of the transparent and immutable nature of blockchain, all users can trust 






Although opportunism may never be completely avoided, it is drastically lowered on the Maker 
platform through the alignment of incentives such as the DAI and MKR tokens, through which all 
holders are encouraged to increase value. As token-holders have shared ownership, they are jointly 
incentivised to ensure good governance, as bad governance would likely harm the value of the Maker 
network, thus decreasing the value of their token holdings.  
Furthermore, the severity of bounded rationality and opportunism is dependent on three variables. 
These variables may be considered both in terms of endogenous and exogenous costs (Williamson, 
1973, 1975): 
• Frequency  
The impact of frequency on transaction costs is made redundant by the fact that there are no search 
or bargaining costs when transacting on the Maker platform. Therefore, the process and cost of 
transacting remain equal to the market rate of Maker regardless of the number of transactions 
performed.  
• Uncertainty  
Uncertainty is avoided on Maker through the use of smart contracts that are cryptographically 
enforced via the blockchain’s consensus protocol. These smart contracts are hardcoded to self-
execute pre-agreed actions as soon as the relevant conditions are met. There is no entity on the 
platform that can override the execution of a smart contract. The only exception is when the 
liquidation ratio of the CDP falls below the required 150% minimum collateral ratio. However, this is 
agreed upon when opening the smart contract and therefore forms part of the agreement. 
• Asset specificity 
DAI is a fungible token and all DAI tokens are therefore of equal value, regardless of when they were 
created. In addition, DAI is infinitely divisible, enhancing the token’s usefulness for transactions of any 
size. The fact that DAI is both fungible and infinitely divisible means that asset specificity is no longer 
a significant issue. 
 
 Final remarks on MakerDAO 
In Chapter 4, an exploratory framework on cryptoeconomics was discussed and the need for novel 




as units of account and stores of value. Here, Maker or more specifically DAI and MKR were used to 
validate this argument as both tokens may act as units of account, stores of value, and means of 
payment. In addition, we highlighted the need for new measurement methods to calculate value in 
response to the rising importance of intangible capital. Here too, Maker illustrates this argument as 
the entire platform’s value is derived from the utility of its two tokens DAI and MKR, which are 
classified as intangible capital (EY, 2018; PwC, 2018). Therefore, current measurement techniques 
cannot be used to value a cryptonetwork such as Maker, as its intangible nature renders the task 
impossible using conventional fundamental analyses. Finally, the fundamental value of the MKR token 
exclusively reflects the quality of governance of MakerDAO. The MKR token provides a good example 
of the use of fundamental value as a framework to test whether a token is fulfilling the production it 
posits to enable (i.e., governance of the Maker platform). 
It is important to note that Maker forms part of only the first generation of cryptonetworks. It is 
therefore unsurprising that Maker’s cryptoeconomic mechanisms focus on traditional ‘token 
engineering’, such as low transactions costs and the creation of economic incentives, to ensure 
optimal behaviour from network users. As blockchain technology matures, future forms of 
cryptonetworks will expand to address the wider social issues of production, distribution, and the 




6 Conclusion & future research areas 
This study began by describing the technology of blockchain, which enables the novel creation of trust 
within a decentralised environment, and through which new industries will come into existence. Prior 
to blockchain technology, creating and enforcing trust between transacting parties always required a 
third-party such as a banking institution. Trust is vital to the development of several new activities and 
the transformation of existing activities. Blockchain technology provides answers to the age-old 
question also known as the Byzantine Generals Problem: how can we create trust between two or 
more parties to complete exchanges of something of value? This was first achieved using the threat 
of force, then via central institutions such as governments, and now through distributed 
cryptonetworks by way of decentralised consensus protocols. 
Historically, the pipeline business model has been the model of choice for the largest companies in 
the world. However, the digital transformation of the global economy has brought new business 
models to the forefront. Namely, the platform business model where value is realised through the 
creations of the community in the ecosystem. Cryptonetworks look to build upon, disrupt and 
potentially form entirely new business models by blending the functionality of centralised platforms 
with the community-orientated nature of the original open protocols of the internet. In doing so, 
cryptonetworks enable value creation to be correctly assigned to the actual content creators through 
tokens.  
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase questioned the need for the firm if markets could maximise 
incentives. He argued that when operating outside of firms, prices dictate production decisions, and 
coordination occurs through a sequence of transactions in the market. However, in a firm, market 
transactions are replaced by entrepreneur-dictated production decisions. Therefore, the market and 
firm simply offer alternative production co-ordinating options. The trade-off relationship between the 
firm and market is inverse and linear, and a transaction can either benefit from reduced transaction 
costs in the firm or incentive maximisation in the market, but not both. According to Coase, firms are 
needed because of the costs associated with using the market’s price mechanism, also known as 
transaction costs. 
Applying cryptonetworks to the theory of the firm introduces an alternative that bridges the gap or 
trade-off between the firm and the market. The trade-off relationship between the firm and the 
market is pushed outwards to produce a concave graph, representing a fundamental change in the 
cost structure of a firm. Like markets, cryptonetworks allow people to conduct economic activity 
without a central decision-maker through economic incentivisation mechanisms powered by tokens. 




transactions. More specifically, through blockchain technology, cryptonetworks reduce search and 
information costs by allowing information to flow in a trusted manner, through consensus protocols, 
and easily, as it is public. Bargaining costs are reduced through the streamlined discovery of 
cryptonetworks that use open-source software in which terms are known to all, open data, and 
auction techniques that further reduce information asymmetry. And instead of driving enforcement 
through a centralised firm, cryptonetworks use decentralised consensus protocols and embedded 
logic to enforce contracts. 
Lastly, the decentralised nature of cryptonetworks combats the negative behaviours of centralised 
networks which have shown to turn from a positive-sum game to zero-sum game as adoption reaches 
a critical level. This switch comes at the expense of network participants who are left with no option 
but to comply with the new rules, including those who originally contributed to the initial value of the 
network’s growth. In contrast, cryptonetworks remain neutral throughout their growth and reward 
participants for their contributions through tokens. However, cryptonetworks will not always be the 
best option for all services but rather only for those that excel in decentralised environments. This is 
because the organisation and alignment of incentives for network participants only perform as 
intended in decentralised environments. 
The application of orthodox economics in the context of cryptonetworks, also known as 
cryptoeconomics, is rather conventional and conservative. Applying such theories limits the potential 
of cryptoeconomics and cryptographically enabled, distributed economic-social systems that could 
introduce drastically different politics and ways to capture and measure value. What is often referred 
to as ‘token engineering’ restricts the potential use of tokens, which may represent more than just an 
incentivisation mechanism. Today’s measurement frameworks suffer from the inability to accurately 
measure economic activities that have no market price, such as household production, the informal 
sector, and subsistence production. This is a well-known limitation of the traditional GDP production 
function. In response to these limitations, measurement concepts such as ‘triple-bottom-line 
reporting’ and ‘ethical investing’ were introduced. However, these measurement criteria still only 
apply to a profit-centric measurement outcome.  
Tokens provide an opportunity to re-evaluate this value creation measurement question. As a means 
of exchange, tokens facilitate new ways of trading and as a unit of account, they represent new means 
of measuring output. Production value cannot be reduced to the single measure of monetary price, 
which should instead be treated as one of many measurement indexes. In addition, token valuation 
techniques must be developed to address the contributions of intangible capital adequately, unlike 




crypto economy is also questionable. The Hayekian price is the condensation of multiple determinants 
of data that otherwise would be too complex to process. However, blockchain and more specifically 
tokens introduce fundamentally new ways of handling such complex information. Today, price is 
treated by society as the absolute social measure of value although a more suitable index would 
include a ‘social’ index/price that would capture new forms of value. Under a Hayekian framework, 
calculating a social index is almost impossible and would require a monumental cultural shift with 
regard to social as well as economic norms. The shift would imply economic production for value as 
opposed to profit. However, producing for value is arguably no less logical than producing for profit. 
Tokens offer a unique value proposition in situations of production for the sake of value and allow for 
experimentation in developing a social index of price, by testing multiple valuation indexes that 
express different social priorities, as profit price expresses the priorities of capitalism. Profit price is 
not made redundant, as monetary prices will always hold value within a capitalist society, but it is 
important to expand upon this by incorporating other socially quantifiable indexes that are valued 
equally and incorporate a holistic view that benefits society and not just a select few. 
This study has shown that our understanding of blockchain remains ill-defined, unstructured and 
limited. In particular, token valuation models are still in the exploratory phase and each model has 
exhibited its limitations. The limited understanding provides fertile ground for further research. 
Moreover, further research could contribute to realising the full potential that tokens have to offer in 
measuring and capturing value. Research contributions are likely to come from a wide range of 
disciplines in addition to economics – from finance, computer science and philosophy, for example. 
As blockchain matures, so too will cryptonetworks. There is undoubtedly significant future potential 
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